The Fundamental Nature of Science and Religion – Part I

Introductory note
Ethnography of Primitive peoples
The Duality of Initiation
Metaphysics – Logos of the vegetative principle
The Root Brain de-brained
Deep Ecology
A new Ethics, a new Metaphysics, a new Religion
Collective States of Subjectivity: Church, Totem, Rite, Belief and Spirit
Duality of the Sacred and the Mundane
Notes – Part I
Bibliography – Part I

Introductory note
Theories of Quantum mechanics (QM) and what one might term Social mechanics (SM), point in uncomfortably disparate directions. QM teaches that macro-phenomena (a rock, tea cup, tree, star…) are bound by fundamental causal rules, and that micro-phenomena (individual physical particles: fermion, boson, hadron) can become completely disconnected from the chain of causality. SM teaches the inverse; that micro-phenomena (individual actors) are bound by and represent fundamental causal rules, while macro-phenomena (emergent social properties, such as intelligence, mind, religion, science, patterns of political voting, segregation/clustering, the common good) are somehow disconnected from the causal chain. This represents a beautiful conceptual symmetry, but why and how, and where and when may non-causal events and properties be observed?

Causality is observable only within our ‘human scale’ of events, which includes for example the star gazing aspects of astronomy or the cell watching aspects of microbiology. However, at the boundaries of observation – the boundaries of the ‘human scale’ – causality appears to evaporate. The word ‘anthropocentric’ and the phrase ‘anthropic principle’ are often used to describe the concept of a human scale – the human perspective and scope, beyond which causality appears either to dissolve into complexity, or to disjunct from empirical reality. Holding this in mind, I find it very strange indeed that we can nevertheless identify as ‘necessarily real’ various a-causal phenomena, such as “spooky action at a distance” (quantum entanglement), the big bang and black holes (quantum singularities) dark matter and energy – and equally, the feelings and awareness of self, mind, the bizarre similarity between the lifecycles of individuals, civilizations and species, the persistent socio-cohesive power of the various religions, spiritual and tribal rites, ethics and morals.

At best, the subject matter of the current thesis is iconoclastic, representing factual (causal) and controversial, perhaps even a-causal histories. At worst, the reader will apprehend certain presented arguments and interpretations as unacceptable. I do not presume to convince, but to present the arguments and opinions rendered by a handful of respected peers who have preceded us.

Some of the meanings expressed sit as uncomfortably within the postmodern worldview as they would have within the modern one. I certainly have experienced difficulties and challenges, both intellectual and moral, while studying the ethnographies, histories and theoretical constructs that inform and comprise the subject matter of this essay. The difficulties and discomforts which I have experienced, may have resulted from the assumed near-absolute certainty and cultural flatness in which we, in our systemized and machine-mediated postmodern culture, now live. It has become apparent that regardless of the assumed level of certainty we feel, or think we have achieved, no such level of definition of certainty exists in the reality that we perceive, nor in any reality that we create – bar one – the internal mental dynamic state of individual knowledge (cognition). An individual mind may feel certain of some variable x, whereas a collective of minds comes to consensus, rendering precision of x but not certainty of it.

The ambiguities which appear to be, or perhaps are, endemic to the subjects and materials presented, do not entirely confound precision in the task of finding a common moral ground between Science and Religion. As in the sciences and religions, precision has been endowed to this project by necessary cut-offs of the definitional phase spaces used. Examples of this are the definitions of religion and primitive peoples, rendered by Durkheim in 1912, which we shall assume for the purposes of this essay:

“A religion is a unified system of beliefs and practices relative to sacred things set apart and forbidden – beliefs and practices which unite into one single moral community called a Church, all those who adhere to them.”

Primitive peoples are assumed to have been nomadic tribal cultures of hunter-gatherer-gardeners, composed of extended familial groupings (clans), with no written language and only a rudimentary level of technological sophistication – living prior to the cultural and environmental influences that were imposed upon them through contact and colonization by sedentary agrarian civilizations with greater technological sophistication and written language.

David Émile Durkheim was a French sociologist, greatly influenced by the positivist philosophy and scientific approach to the study of society (ethnography), which had been founded by Auguste Comte a lifetime before him. Among Durkheim’s published social analyses is one titled The Elementary Forms of Religious Life [1], in which the religious practices and beliefs of aboriginal Australian and American peoples are discussed. Elementary Forms has lent valuable defining criteria to the task of identifying the nature of religion.

In our time, systems, beliefs, practices, unifications (categorizations) and communities all seem quite familiar and scientific ideas, whereas morality (the good and true path) and sacredness (the state of being set apart, forbidden) seem rather more distant and less relevant to science.

The practice of science, as defined by modern scientific method, has been well documented and propagated, and is commonly understood as an aspect of modern global human culture. Can anything meaningful be said of morality or of sacredness in the sciences? In order to create a background context, we shall begin our exploration with the ethnography of primitive humans, and unexpectedly, magic.

Ethnography of Primitive peoples
Redfield described the work of Bronislaw Malinowski (1948) [2] as a process of “look at the people, then look back at the books, and then look again at the people”, and told that Malinowski did not look at the people to find what the books told him he should find. The human reality upon which he periodically refocused, could not be fully represented by any single theory, though he has been described as a proponent of psychological functionalism – arguing that social and cultural institutions serve basic human needs. Malinowski took account of the views rendered by Tylor, Frazer, Marett, and Durkheim, to discover religion emerging more multidimensionally than in any single account – “religion is not only people explaining and projecting their dreams; it is not only a sort of spiritual electric – mana –; it is not solely to be recognized in social communion.”

“Religion and magic are ways men must have, being men, to make the world acceptable, manageable, and right.”
– Malinowski (1948)

Translating this into postmodernism, I would add science (however primitive), replace the word ”men” with people, and strengthen the idea of a “right” world with a moral one, thus rendering: Religion, science and magic are ways humans must have, being human, to make the world acceptable, manageable and moral.

Of the three domains, even assuming some naivety about religion, what we now understand as magic, seems the least necessary for an acceptable, manageable and moral world. However, what we now understand as magic is more-or-less complex trickery (change blindness), whereas in antiquity it seems to have been apprehended more earnestly, as a combination of what we now understand as science and religion – an holistic knowledge comprising natural philosophy, various arts and natural theology – in a word perhaps, alchemy.

Malinowski marked that “when the sociologist approaches the study of magic [they find] an entirely sober, prosaic, even clumsy art, enacted for purely practical reasons, governed by crude and shallow beliefs, carried out in a simple and monotonous technique … strictly limited in its means of action, circumscribed in its beliefs, stunted in its fundamental assumptions.” He noted also that “magic never originated, it never has been made or invented. All magic simply was from the beginning an essential adjunct of all such things and processes as vitally interest man and yet elude his normal rational efforts.”

“In Central Australia, all magic existed and has been inherited from the alcheringa times, when it came about like everything else. In Melanesia all magic comes from a time when humanity lived underground and when magic was a natural knowledge of ancestral man. In higher societies magic is often derived from spirits and demons, but even these, as a rule, originally received and did not invent it. Thus the belief in the primeval natural existence of magic is universal.”

Interestingly, “magic tends to become specialized, exclusive, departmental and hereditary. In totemism each species naturally becomes the responsibility and privilege of a clan; and each clan reveres its head specialist as the chief magician of its totem. Totemism is essentially a cooperative system, a number of practical, specialized cults, each with its own social basis but all having one common end: “the supply of the tribe with abundance” – A set of diverse and diversifying, specialized actors creating abundance is familiar terminology, expressed in a previous essay titled The Common Good, as the best manner to achieve and maintain common goods.

Science may be described in a very similar manner, as specialized, exclusive, departmental and hereditary. The latter is no longer commonly recognized, but surely has remained a key aspect of modern social mechanics. After all, it is a special and distinct privilege, still largely propagated by familial lineages, to be schooled and educated by elite institutions of indoctrination, such as the University of Oxford, the California Institute of Technology, Stanford University, the University of Cambridge, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Harvard University, Princeton University, Imperial College London, and ETH Zurich.

In critique of Durkheim, who suggested that religious feeling (“effervescence”) occurs exclusively as a consequence of collectivity, Malinowski pointed-out that “the heightening of emotions and the lifting of the individual out of himself are by no means restricted to gatherings and to crowd phenomena. The lover near his sweetheart, the daring adventurer conquering his fears in the face of real danger, the hunter at grips with a wild animal, the craftsman achieving a masterpiece, whether he be savage or civilized, will under such conditions feel altered, uplifted, endowed with higher forces. And there can be no doubt that from many of these solitary experiences where man feels the forebodings of death, the pangs of anxiety, the exaltation of bliss, there flows a great deal of religious inspiration.”

Implicit here is not only the concept of collectivity vs individuality, but also the ontological relationship between supervenience and top-down causation. Religions and sciences may be said to emerge from innate characteristics through social (inter)actions, while religious and scientific morals – good and true ways – are embedded within individual (inter)actors, by their initiation into the worldview (indoctrination, mysticism) in which they live.

“There are no peoples however primitive without religion and magic … Nor are there … any savage races lacking either in the scientific attitude or in science, though this lack has been frequently attributed to them. In every primitive community, studied by trustworthy and competent observers, there have been found two clearly distinguishable domains, the Sacred and the Profane; in other words, the domain of Magic and Religion, and that of Science.”

With this Malinowski seems to have meant that the domains of Magic and Religion are sacred, whereas the domain of Science is profane. He was clear about the fact that the primitive Melanesians whom he observed, understood that magic alone would not raise their garden crops nor provide a school of fish to net, that without mundane observations and profane manual labors, gardens do not bear fruit and fish are not caught. Furthermore, while Durkheim proposed that sacrament is necessarily based upon mundane empirical observations and acts, as well as social cohesion, and that magic relies on neither, Malinowski opined that magic is an art (craft) the purpose of which is to apply supernatural forces to the natural environment. Both Durkheim and Malinowski told that primitive peoples are capable of and make regular natural use of scientific mental modeling – a cycling of practical (empirical) trial and error, due to need or curiosity, then inference, usually followed by communication, before beginning another round of empiricism.

“On the one hand there are the traditional acts and observances [rites], regarded by the natives as sacred, carried out with reverence and awe, hedged around with prohibitions and special rules of behavior. Such acts and observances are always associated with beliefs in supernatural forces, especially those of magic, or with ideas about beings, spirits, ghosts, dead ancestors, or gods. On the other hand, a moment’s reflection is sufficient to show that no art or craft however primitive could have been invented or maintained, no organized form of hunting, fishing, tilling, or search for food could be carried out without the careful observation of natural process and a firm belief in its regularity, without the power of reasoning and without confidence in the power of reason; that is, without the rudiments of science.”

The word ‘supernatural’ refers to a property belonging to a realm that is supervenient on nature – that is to say, supernature is dependent upon but separate from and not reduceable to natural phenomena, and thus is not necessarily causally
connected to nature. The logic of causal (non)connection between fundamental and emergent properties is argued well by Humphreys (1997) [3].

Supernature is understood as unobservable, because any presupposed object or force occupying a supernatural realm may not be accessible to natural empirical investigation due to its possible causal disconnection from natural phenomena – simultaneously and necessarily negating the possibility of subsequent physical confirmation or Popperian falsification. This allows for a clear distinction between the supernatural and imaginary (abstract) realms, as the latter, whether mathematical or not, and whether communicated or not, does exist within the natural setting of one or more minds, which supervene on physical and material forms of organismal intelligence (brains).

An argument that is often expressed in attempts to formulate a fundamental distinction between the sciences and religions is that Science necessarily observes nature empirically, and thus understands nature as a set of real, physical phenomena, whereas Religion accepts as real that which is not necessarily empirically observable. Herein however, lies a problem – Science does not always directly observe the natural phenomena or processes which it attempts to describe, and thus confirm or negate as part of the scientific system of beliefs. Similarly, albeit inversely, religious apprehensions are necessarily the results of empirical observations, or equally real and natural abstracted imaginings (insights). The supernatural can thus comprise neither, natural phenomena, such as electrons, cells and stars, nor forms of abstract existence, such as ideas, concepts and schemes (see NOTE A).

Malinowski reported that Sir James Frazer (1890) [4] had outlined the three main problems of primitive religion with which modern anthropology is concerned – “magic and its relation to religion and science; totemism and the sociological
aspect of early faith; the cults of fertility and vegetation.”

“Frazer’s Golden Bough, the great codex of primitive magic, shows clearly that animism is not the only, nor even the dominating belief in primitive culture. Early man seeks above all to control the course of nature for practical ends, and he does it directly, by rite and spell, compelling wind and weather, animals and crops to obey his will. Only much later, finding the limitations of his magical might, does he in fear or hope, in supplication or defiance, appeal to higher beings; that is, to demons, ancestor-spirits or gods. It is in this distinction between direct control on the one hand and propitiation of superior powers on the other that Sir James Frazer sees the difference between religion and magic. Magic, based on man’s confidence that he can dominate nature directly, if only he knows the laws which govern it magically, is in this akin to science. Religion, the confession of human impotence in certain matters, lifts man above the magical level, and later on maintains its independence side by side with science, to which magic has to succumb.”

“This theory of magic and religion has been the starting-point of most modern studies of the twin subjects. Professor Preuss [et al] have independently set forth certain views, partly in criticism of Frazer, partly following up the lines of his inquiry. These writers point out that similar as they appear, science and magic differ yet radically. Science is born of experience, magic made by tradition. Science is guided by reason and corrected by observation, magic, impervious to both, lives in an atmosphere of mysticism [from Ancient Greek μύστης, mústēs, “one who has been initiated”]. Science is open to all, a common good of the whole community, magic is occult, taught through mysterious initiations, handed on in a hereditary or at least in very exclusive filiation. While science is based on the conception of natural forces, magic springs from the idea of a certain mystic, impersonal power, which is believed in by most primitive peoples. This power, called mana by some Melanesians, arungquiltha by certain Australian tribes, wakan, orenda, manitu by various American Indians, and nameless elsewhere, is stated to be a well-nigh universal idea found wherever magic flourishes. According to the writers just mentioned we can find among the most primitive peoples and throughout the lower savagery a belief in a supernatural, impersonal force, moving all those agencies which are relevant to the savage and causing all the really important events in the domain of the sacred. Thus mana, not animism, is the essence of “pre-animistic religion,” and it is also the essence of magic, which is thus radically different from science.”

The natural, all-pervading force – mana, arungquiltha, wakan, orenda, manitu – is Hollywood famous, and perhaps analogous to the Tao. Animism is a belief focused upon individual agents rather than a flow throughout nature, though entropy, gravity and electromagnetism surely do flow through and animate all things, whether living or not; both individuals and complex collective aggregates, whether comprising a speck of dust, grain of sand, mountain range, or galactic cluster.

One achievement of modern anthropology that Malinowski did not find cause to question is “the recognition that magic and religion are not merely a doctrine or a philosophy, not merely an intellectual body of opinion, but a special mode of behavior, a pragmatic attitude built up of reason, feeling, and will alike. It is a mode of action as well as a system of belief, and a sociological phenomenon as well as a personal experience.” – the dynamic and ever-nascent complex state of consensual, individual subjective reality, emerging from a collective of human social interactions – strongly embedded within the natural environment.

The view taken by Levy-Bruhl in Primitive Mentality (1923), suggests that primitive minds have no “sober moods”, but are completely immersed in their current mysticism. Thus, primitive minds live as a society of recognized initiates, individuals or groups that are embedded within the flow of a current worldview. “They are incapable of dispassionate and consistent observation, devoid of the power of abstraction, hampered by a decided aversion towards reasoning, they are unable to draw any benefit from experience, to construct or comprehend even the most elementary laws of nature. For minds thus orientated there is no fact purely physical, nor can there exist for them any clear idea of substance and attribute, cause and effect, identity and contradiction. Their outlook is that of confused superstition, pre-logical, made of mystic participations and exclusions.”

Scathing though this passage is, it has a fascinating, if unfortunate resonance with the common 21st century worldview – aptly termed postmodernism. Critically, postmodernism is a recognition of current modernity only in the sense that it is not the state of modernity that came before it. Our current age is thus laden with a sense of intrinsic change and fungibility – simply, albeit poignantly – a world in transition. The spirit of transition does not provide any clear and unambiguous knowledge of what or where to, or even why we are transiting – the only clear truth experienced by the majority of individuals appears to be one of necessarily ultra-rapid, or better immediate, machine-mediated transfer. Thus, thinking time (Nous Kairos) is not generally apprehended in postmodernity, but skipped or scrubbed – philosophy is viewed as an unproductive “waste of time”.

Architect Thomas Rau (2013) – more eloquently in his native Dutch (2015) – describes our current worldview as one of evolution, and of linear development in technologies and economies, not for the purpose of creating solutions, but problems – “New”, he observes, has come to mean “not quite broken yet”, as a result of planned obsolescence – the engineering of lifespans into products. He proposes a circular economy of raw materials, in which mineral element ores are first mined for use in the production of product-service values, then re-extracted (“de-mounted”) from these product-services to enable reuse (“re-mounting”) into new product-service values.

It should be appreciated that although Rau’s proposition is timely, fitting well within the ethos of postmodernity, it is neither a solution nor destination. The acceptance and implementation of his proposal could act only to propagate the postmodern sense of change and fungibility – the confused outlook, superstition (belief in the existence of a ‘state beyond the current state’) and mysticism of the 21st century. Thus by Levy-Bruhl’s definition, the postmodern mind may be judged as nearly so primitive as the primitive mind, and indeed one should not find this overly surprising, as human minds, whether primitive or postmodern, share a fundamentally human nature.

Malinowski also reported the critical views of J. L. Myers (c. 1911) and A. A. Goldenweiser (c. 1930) – primitive knowledge is distinct, accurate, and based upon observation. Primitive discoveries, inventions and improvements, “which could hardly be attributed to any pre-empirical or pre-logical mind – affirm that “it would be unwise to ascribe to the primitive mechanic merely a passive part in the origination of inventions. Many a happy thought must have crossed his mind, nor was he wholly unfamiliar with the thrill that comes from an idea effective in action.” Here we see the savage endowed with an attitude of mind wholly akin to that of a modern man of science! … The use of leaves, notched sticks, and similar aids to memory is well known and seems to be almost universal. All such ‘diagrams’ are means of reducing a complex and unwieldy bit of reality to a simple and handy form. They give man a relatively easy mental control over it. As such are they not – in a very rudimentary form no doubt – fundamentally akin to developed scientific formulas and models, which are also simple and handy paraphrases of a complex or abstract reality, giving the civilized physicist mental control over it?”

“Can we regard primitive knowledge, which … is both empirical and rational, as a rudimentary stage of science, or is it not at all related to it? If by science be understood a body of rules and conceptions, based on experience and derived from it by logical inference, embodied in material achievements and in a fixed form of tradition and carried on by some sort of social organization – then there is no doubt that even the lowest savage communities have the beginnings of science, however rudimentary. Most epistemologists would not, however, be satisfied with such a minimum definition of science, for it might apply to the rules of an art or craft as well. They would maintain that the rules of science must be laid down explicitly, open to control by experiment and critique by reason. They must not only be rules of practical behavior, but theoretical laws of knowledge. Even accepting this stricture, however, there is hardly any doubt that many of the principles of savage knowledge are scientific in this sense.”

The Duality of Initiation
In his attempt to gain a clearer understanding of whether the primitive mind has “one domain of reality or two”, Malinowski found a “profane world of practical activities and rational outlook” along-side, but distinct from “the sacred region of cult and belief.”

With regard to initiation, Malinowski reported two consequent sets of rites:
i) The physical ordeal – a protracted period of seclusion sometimes accompanied by fasting and various forms of preparation (perhaps painted skin markings, certain clothes or other artifacts), followed by submission to an act of bodily mutilation, such as a small incision, the knocking out of a tooth, circumcision, or penile subincision.
ii) A less dramatic, but in reality more important, psychological aspect of initiation then begins – “the systematic instruction of the youth in sacred myth and tradition, the gradual unveiling of tribal mysteries and the exhibition of sacred objects.” It is by the latter process that individuals become initiates – indoctrinated into a particular mysticism – and learn to apprehend the world though a particular cultural lens (worldview).

Mysticisms are no less mystical for the modern and postmodern mind, than for the ancient and primitive one. Take as example Nudge theory – a development of the behavioral and social sciences. “Putting fruit at eye level counts as a nudge. Banning junk food does not.”

“Initiation is a typically religious act … the ceremony and its purpose are one … the function of such acts in society [is to] create mental habits and social usages of inestimable value to the group … initiation brings the novice into relationship with higher powers and personalities, such as the Guardian Spirits and Tutelary Divinities.”
– Malinowski (1948)

“Of all qualities, truth to tradition is the most important. A society that makes its tradition sacred gains an inestimable, irrational advantage of power and permanence. Beliefs and practices that put a halo of sanctity around tradition, marking it as supernatural, will have a ‘survival value’ for the type of civilization in which they have evolved.” Yet, as stated earlier, supernature cannot in principle exist because human conceptions or apprehensions of supernatural agency necessarily exist as aspects of natural, organic, physical phenomena (i.e. organismal entropy-reducing systems), and as social behaviors emerging from collectives of such phenomena. Sanctity and sacredness, though apparently causally disconnected from our human scale of observation, serve and impress us as values of morale and survival – development, propagation, dispersal, multiplication – vegetation.

Metaphysics – Logos of the Vegetative Principle
“Propagation and nutrition stand first and foremost among the vital concerns of man.”
– Malinowski (1948)

Nutrition (growth) stands before propagation – that is to say, one cannot propagate without first having grown – the principles of growth and reproduction (multiplication, vegetation) are intertwined, holding true for all known life-systems, and might also be argued for mountains, rivers, stars, black holes, galaxies… The vegetative principle is intimately paired with individuality and sociality – the former (individual growth and propagation) is necessary for the latter (emergent sociality and culture).

Sequential physical phenomenology of the vegetative principle:
As a necessary and direct physical consequence of the localized entropy-reducing processes mediated by biological materials, organismal foraging (behavior) must emerge. Thus, behaviors are fundamentally and necessarily, dynamic embodiments (organismal developments, vegetations) of a physical and functional coupling between the sensory mechanisms of an organism (empirical perceptions) and response mechanisms (metabolic switch, motility, etc.). Furthermore, fundamental behavioral mechanisms are both, mediated and modulated by direct transfer, from the environment to the organism, of energy-laden environmental materials – signals (see NOTE B).

Social foraging (sociality) is necessarily dependent upon organismal behaviors, but reaches beyond these – by downward causation, to fortify the founding biological process of localized entropy-reduction, and by supervenience, rendering a (non)causal superposition of a physical and abstract social reality.

Critically, the mechanisms of social foraging (communicative signaling, signal interpretation and signal-based action) do not necessarily transfer energy-laden environmental materials directly to the organism, but instead comprise an understanding (a collective strategic knowledge) of both, energy-laden materials and signal-laden materials/properties – among phototrophs, shading by other organisms is a signal-laden property – a limited common good (see: The Common Good I and II).

Knowledge is thus dependent upon (re)active and (co)operative individual organisms, within an energy/signal-laden physical material matrix – the social environment. A complex thus comprised exists as a distributed body of knowledge – that is to say, knowledge is an organismal abstraction (pattern, or map) composed of physical and material signals that represent the state of the environment. And naturally, how to make (entropy-reduce) the best of it.

Sociality and knowledge, though not completely identical, are intimately and physically – not necessarily completely materially – coupled, emerging as the effect of physically mediated abstract symbolism. We may thus confirm biosemiosis as deeply rooted in the evolutionary scheme of life-systems.

Proposed here, is that one developmental form (dynamic embodiment, vegetation) of this fundamental sociophysical mechanism, has in modernity come to be called Science, and that this same sociophysical mechanism has progressed through what were once called natural philosophy and natural theology – together alchemy. Scientific behavior did not spontaneously emerge via the scientific revolution during the Enlightenment – only our modern understanding of Science did.

The Root Brain de-brained
Durkheim suggested that reason alone does not negate the idea that inanimate bodies (plants, ponds, rivers, mountains, stars, galaxies, etc.) may be animated by some undefined natural force, as animal bodies are, even though modern scientific understanding has not easily accommodated this idea.

The development of molecular biology, has greatly increased the scope and depth of knowledge of biological processes, and is now beginning to allow an understanding of plant bodies as sensing, (re)active and social – animated. Fascinatingly, this has allowed for observations of assumed intelligent behaviors among plants. Over a century after Darwin proposed the root brain hypothesis, Trewavas (2003) [5] reported a study conducted in 1974 by David Stenhouse, in which a tentative definition of animal intelligence was stated as:
Adaptively variable behavior within the lifetime of an individual – with greater adaptive variability (behavioral diversification) associated with greater intelligence.

Trewavas related the long-standing opinion that behavior equates with movement, and since plants move at rates that are for the most part imperceptible to humans, the plant Kingdom has, from the time of Aristotle, been relegated to “unintelligent vegetation”. However, as a result of the continuous changeability and uncertainty of environmental nutritive conditions, the development of sessile organisms is necessarily plastic throughout individual lifetimes. Plasticity is by all accounts reported as being adaptive and variable between environmental conditions, thus leading to the conclusion that sessile life systems must incorporate computational elements. Trewavas argues that as all plants exhibit adaptive plasticity within individual lifetimes, they must all exhibit intelligent behavior, in accordance with the definition given by Stenhouse. As examples, Trewavas relates the finding of signal transduction within plant tissues as well as between plants, and of the close similarity and often completely identical messaging molecules found in plants and animals. Of particular interest was the recognition that complex macromolecular assemblages are transported between plant cells, as this function has the capacity to transfer very complex and subtle differences of message, as was exposed for astroglial syncytia and slime molds in earlier chapters, titled Insanity of Genius and Anatomy of Genius.

Two forms of memory have been recognized in plants; the storage of information from previous signaling paired with an information retrieval capacity, and the ability to interact with and modify a current signal pathway. Furthermore, as individual organisms live in varied niches within their fundamental habitat, each individual must be capable of recognizing very subtle variations of the niche in which it is situated, from the fundamental habitat, and to specifically adapt to these. This capability represents physiological plasticity, which must be conducted under tight regulatory feedback systems, if healthy development (fitness) of the individual is to ensue.

Trewavas concluded by posing a question which shows how little we understand about the nature of vegetation, as well as what we think we mean by use of the word ‘intelligence’:
“If we accept that plants are capable of intelligent behavior, then how is this intelligence accomplished without a brain?”
He has suggested that intelligent behavior is an emergent property, resulting from the interactions of individual cells living as part of a larger cellular collective.

Deep Ecology
In a paper titled Deep Ecology versus Ecofeminism, Robert Sessions (1991) [6] told that Arne Næss coined the label “deep ecology” in The Shallow and the Deep, Long-Range Ecology Movements (1973), and that Næss is seen as the seminal thinker of the deep ecology movement.

Four fundamental characteristics of deep ecology:
i) The well-being and flourishing of human and non-human life on Earth have value in themselves. These values are independent of the usefulness of the non-human world for human purpose.
ii) Richness and diversity of life forms contribute to the realization of these values and are also values in themselves.
iii) Humans have no right to reduce this richness and diversity except to satisfy vital needs.
iv) The flourishing of human life and cultures is compatible with a substantial decrease of the human population. The flourishing of non-human life requires such a decrease.

“Naess and the many deep ecologists who agree with him begin by asserting the fundamental equality and inherent value of all beings and then draw inferences for human action from their original anti-anthropomorphism.”
– Bourdeau (2014)

However, Auguste Comte must be credited as the first modern academic to express “a deep awareness of what man and animals have in common”, and that “cooperation between men is continuous with phenomena of which biology gives further examples.”

The Western (now Global) anthropocentric attitude:
i) Non-human nature has no value in itself.
ii) Humans (and/or God, if theistic) create value.
iii) Humans have the right (business would say obligation) to do as they please in the non-human world as long as they do not harm other human interests.

Diverse specific alternatives to anthropocentrism are offered by deep ecologists, though the general consensus appears to be the proposition of a higher unity in the diversity of the world. In a similar vein of thinking, ecofeminist K. Warren (1987) has suggested that traditional male-identified beliefs, values and attitudes, render assumptions of status and prestige; that a patriarchal conceptual framework is characterized by value-hierarchies, and hence a domination logic that legitimizes inequality. Further, she suggested that before the greater/lesser metaphor, one would have seen only that there exists diversity; “everything is interconnected with everything else; all parts of an ecosystem have equal value; there is no free lunch; ‘nature knows best’; healthy, balanced ecosystems must maintain diversity; there is unity in diversity.”

“Women are identified with nature and the realm of the physical; men are identified with the human and the realm of the mental”.
– Karen Warren (1990)

Warren exposed the parallel conceptualizations of the domination of women by men and the domination of nature by humans, posing that:
i) Humans, not nature, possess the capacity to consciously and radically change the environment in which they live.
ii) The capacity and execution of conscious and radical change to the environment in which one lives is morally superior to a lack of such capacity and/or execution.
iii) If x is morally superior to y, then x is morally justified in subordinating y. Thus, humans are assumed to be morally justified in subordinating nature.

The parallel conceptualization of domination is rendered by replacing the words ‘humans’ with ‘men’ and ‘nature’ with ‘women’. Furthermore, Warren proposed that the second and third premises of the argument are normative value assumptions; without them normative arguments for domination of women/nature fail. In this light, ecological and feminist perspectives are equivalent, anyone taking an anti-feminist stand simultaneously takes an anti-naturist stand.

Sessions (1991) told that the core of deep ecology calls for a new (or the return to an old) sensibility. Modem humans have lost touch with nature and thus with their own natures – we no longer feel the rhythms of nature within ourselves, we have split ourselves from the world (dualism), and we live at a distance – alienated from what is natural – leaving us fearful, insecure and able to deal with the world only on our own terms – with control. We have become insensitive to ourselves and others by losing our natural sensibilities. Deep ecologists look to holistic traditions for suggestions about how to experience the world.

“Multi-faceted high level self-realization is more easily reached through a spartan life-style than through the material standard of average citizens of industrial states.”
– Arne Næss (1986)

In conclusion, Sessions suggested that spotted owls and aquifers are not our relatives in the same way as other humans can be. Our task is no less than to change our cultural morals, to exchange our dominant worldview for one in which our relationships with the elements and inhabitants of the nonhuman, as well as the human world, are comprehended as egalitarian – equal but different.

In review of the deep ecology movement, George Sessions (1987) [7] told that “Saint Francis was an isolated thinker, urging a return to an animistic ecological egalitarianism in the thirteenth century. As a result of the rise of the scientific/technological worldview, and the modern version of the human domination of the Earth, a countercultural surge of nature-oriented thought developed in the eighteenth century.” And that in the seventeenth century, during the rise of modern science, Spinoza argued against Hobbes’ self-centered materialism and submission to Leviathan (authoritarian, centralized governance) and also argued against Descartes’ mind-body dualism; instead arguing for the establishment of an holistic non-anthropocentric pantheism. In so doing Spinoza influenced “Goethe and other writers of the European Romantic movement, now understood as a nature-oriented, countercultural force aligned against the rise of the narrowly scientific industrial society.”

In the late 1940’s Aldo Leopold recognized the science of ecology as “the outstanding discovery of the twentieth century”. However, it was not until the rise of the Age of Ecology, in the 1960’s, that a wider public perception of ecology and environmentalism emerged. “It is generally acknowledged that Rachel Carson’s Silent Spring [1962] ushered in what can appropriately be called the Age of Ecology. Her attack on pesticides coincided with increasing public awareness of the extent of pollution and the overall environmental destruction that had taken place since the Second World War. Carson’s indictment of pesticide use confirmed growing doubts concerning the technological ability of humans to manage the resources of the planet successfully.” She also challenged anthropocentrism: “The ‘control of nature’ is a phrase conceived in arrogance, born of the Neanderthal age of biology and philosophy, when it was supposed that nature exists for the convenience of man.” The Age of Ecology has allowed for “a religious and philosophical revolution of the first magnitude.” Sessions told of G. Tyler Miller, and of Warwick Fox, who observed that “the ecological revolution will be the most all-encompassing revolution in the history of mankind”, and that “deep ecologists were contributing to a ‘paradigm shift’ of comparable significance to that associated with Copernicus.”

“Deep ecology represents a philosophical challenge to the metaphysical and ethical anthropocentrism that has dominated Western culture, as a result of classical Greek humanism and Judeo-Christian-Islamic traditions.”
– Sessions (1987)

In The Quiet Crisis (1963) Stuart Udall pointed to the changing attitudes of the 1960’s, towards the nature religions and “land wisdom” of the American Indians: “Today the conservation movement finds itself turning back to ancient Indian land ideas, to the Indian understanding that we are not outside of nature, but of it … we are recovering a sense of reverence for the land.” By the early 1980’s, many academics had come to consensus regarding the spiritual-ecological way of life, practiced by primal societies throughout the world. The general agreement was that an “ecocentric” religious approach, in which everything is respected in its own right, seems to account for tens of thousands of years of cultural success, and that the histories, worldviews and practices of ancient human cultures can provide moderns with good quality understandings of the human/Nature relationship.

Further, Sessions told that in The Arrogance of Humanism David Ehrenfeld argued that “exclusive emphasis upon reason has divorced us from the crucial survival functions of instinct, emotion, and intuition”, and promoted “ecocentric and religious reasons for protecting ecological diversity”. Personally, I do not feel divorced from instinct, emotion, or intuition, though I would admit that these unmeasurable, unquantifiable, aspects of human nature are undervalued in our modern worldview. As will be clear for anyone who has experienced a regular, normal school or work environment. Culturally valued behaviors in modernity are machine-like: consistency, predictability, capacity, efficiency – all are quantifiable, and generally represented probabilistically, as statistical percentages of a norm.

Apparently, John Stuart Mill foresaw a stationary state of population and economy. As the interrelated global economies falter and begin to flatten there is talk of “growthless economics”, and of course the human population on Earth is also approaching environmental, and possibly psychological psycho-social limiting factors.

A new Ethics, a new Metaphysics, a new Religion
Passmore thought the two models of the human-nature relationship – Platonic “stewardship” and Aristotelean “man perfecting nature” – were converging. He endorsed them as the West’s unique contribution to a sound contemporary approach to nature. However, Passmore later backed away from that narrow anthropocentrism, saying “We do need a new metaphysics which is genuinely not anthropocentric … The working out of such a metaphysics is … the most important task which lies ahead of philosophy.”

Arne Næss argued that “the emergence of ecologists from their former relative obscurity marks a turning point in our scientific communities. But their message is twisted and misused.” The shallow movement is a short-term, pragmatic reform approach, in his view, concerned mainly with the symptoms of environmental disease such as pollution and resource depletion. Its objective, Næss claimed, was anthropocentric and parochial – “the health and affluence of people in the developed countries.” The long-range “deep” movement was proposing a major realignment in our thinking about humans and nature consistent with an ecological perspective. Næss claimed that the experiences of ecologists and others associated with wild nature gave rise during the 1960s to scientific conclusions and intuitions that were amazingly similar. These included the awareness of the internal interrelatedness of ecosystems; ecological egalitarianism (all species have an equal right to live and blossom); the principles of diversity and symbiosis; an anti-social-class position; the appreciation of ecological complexity leading to the awareness of the “human ignorance of biospherical relationships – [The ecological field worker] acquires a deep-seated respect, or even veneration, for ways and forms of life, the principles of local autonomy and decentralization.”

Næss described ecological egalitarianism as “an intuition experienced by those in the deep ecology movement, not an ethical theory to be defended by rational argument.”

“Fritjof Capra has pointed to the patriarchal dominance over both women and nature in Western culture since Biblical times. The masculine emphasis upon scientific method and rational analytical thinking, he claimed, “has led to attitudes that are profoundly antiecological.” Rational thinking is linear, whereas “ecological awareness arises from an intuition of nonlinear thinking … The environmental crisis, therefore, is a result of overemphasizing our masculine side and neglecting the feminine (intuitive wisdom … ecological awareness, nurturing, and caring).”

“Modern Western ethics assumes the classical idea of discrete atomistic individuals. And the positivist fact-value distinction, also typical of modern Western ethics, is based upon the subject-object distinction. The new physics undermines both those views … Quantum theory negates the subject-object, fact-value dichotomies to which modern value theory has dutifully conformed.” – “A sound contemporary cosmology failed to develop after the seventeenth century scientific revolution, according to Stephen Toulmin. Instead, Descartes and his successors “set humanity over against nature, and converted the natural world itself into a mere thing or object.” The new physics, Toulmin believes, provides a new opportunity to develop a sound cosmology, which goes beyond fact/value, subject/object distinctions. The new cosmology and theology of nature, he argues, is already developing based on the popular movements of “green philosophy” and “white philosophy,” an integration of ecology with spiritual psychology. Using John Muir and limnologist Evelyn Hutchinson as examples, Toulmin claims that ecology as pure science and ecology as social philosophy can be abstracted and separated, but no sharp divisions can be drawn in the real world. Pointing to the distinction between anthropocentric and nonanthropocentric environmental approaches, he argues that the cosmology and natural religion of the future will be essentially along deep ecological lines.”

“What has been called the New Age/Aquarian Conspiracy movement is largely inspired by the writings of R. Buckminster Fuller and Pierrede Chardin. Both are highly anthropocentric and have an unquestioned faith in high technology and a belief that the destiny of humans is to manage the evolutionary processes of the Earth. Jeremy Rifkin claims that some New Age planners want to eliminate evolutionary processes in order to bring about Algeny – the genetic manipulation and development of all life on Earth. While lip service is paid to ecological ideals, New Age ideology is in many ways antiecological. The New Age version of stewardship sees humans acting as copilots of Spaceship Earth, making management decisions from information gathered through vast computer communication systems.”

Berman distinguished between two types of holism – a sensuous, situational, living approach to process, and an abstract form characteristic of many philosophical spokesmen for “the New Age.” The latter, now in a more appealing form, is the last phase of classical science. “The real issue,” according to Berman, is not mechanism versus holism, but “whether the philosophical system is embodied or disembodied.” Thus, Berman also acknowledged holism and questioned the validity of the Cartesian breakage. In Anatomy of Genius, I have argued in similar fashion, against the substance dualism and “nonphysical substance” (mind/body problem), of Descartes, favoring instead holism and animism.

Collective States of Subjectivity: Church, Totem, Rite, Belief and Spirit
Durkheim taught that religions exist because humans live as social collectives in anthropogenic states. This is a very wide filter setting indeed, arguably including all instituted human activities – all emergent phenomena of human social interactions. And indeed, Durkheim seems to have intended this meaning, identifying any moral community as a Church and recognizing that there are many and varied Churches.

“A group comprised of individuals who have mutually recognized and recognizable identities, which set them in a common and shared, human, cognitive and normative setting.” In Kantian terms, a church or moral community is a collective weltanschauung (worldview), examples of which may be made of nations, families and/or households, corporations, academies, scientific and religious disciplines, etc. The domestic cult comprises a family; the corporate cult comprises a corporation (a corporate culture). These “private religions” or “small Churches” are “special forms of a broader religion … chapels in a larger Church.” This definition of moral community lends itself well to the sciences; Physicists, for example, are not biologists, each scientific discipline comprises a group of individuals who are mutually recognized and recognizable – as physicists (the chapel of Physics), or as biologists (the chapel of Biology) – collected together, the various scientific disciplines may be said to comprise the moral community of science (the Church of Science).

It should be plain to see that scientific moral communities, as well as religions ones, set things apart (categorize) – electrons are not atoms, insects are not organs, stars are not galaxies, and disciplines differ (physics is not chemistry, chemistry is not biology, etc.). The sciences surely do create, and as conservatively as possible, hold beliefs and enact practices that unite all the individuals who adhere to them into a single moral community called Science.

Malinowski agreed with Durkheim’s concept of totemism, as developing reverence and a sense of gratefulness for the animals and plants upon which a human population depends. Simultaneously, the killing and slaughter of individuals of these same revered species is necessary for human survival. They told that “we find a moral value and a biological significance in totemism, in a system of beliefs, practices, and social arrangements.”

i) The outward and visible form of the totemic principle – the worldly expression of the spirit of something. Modern science refers to ‘outward and visible forms’ as empirically observable phenomena, and as we shall see later, there appears also to be a ‘spirit of science’, which expresses the totemic principle of science through scientific theories, laws of nature and what might be termed lineages of vegetative propagation.
ii) The symbol of a particular society – “a mark that is borne by everything that in any way belongs to the clan”.

i) A negative rite (differentiation) is characterized by setting a person and/or object apart from mundane everyday activities and use, through various socially recognized and respected procedures.
ii) A positive rite (integration) is characterized by the bringing together of sanctified people and/or objects, through various socially recognized and respected procedures.

Durkheim chose to observe religious ideas as “done” – performed or enacted as a set of rites. Critically, without the ritual acts associated with the definition of the religious idea, there is no possibility of a shared, collective understanding of the idea. Precisely the same may be said of scientific ideas, which do not exist as aspects of science without being enacted and communicated. Formal symbolisms, such as languages, mathematics or diagrammatic schematic representations, though not necessarily conveying scientific or religious ideas, are not purely abstract – devoid of action – as may be evidenced by any attempt to communicate an idea without some form of action.

Spirits, theories and laws may seem rather more abstract than physical manipulation of material symbols, though all are forms of abstraction. The symbol of a particular society may be an image or sculpture of a Kangaroo, described by Durkheim in the case of the Kangaroo clan, or it may be the letterhead or coat of arms of a particular department or university, or it may be a corporate logo, a family name, etc.

Aboriginal totemic representations, including that of the Kangaroo

Dominus illuminatio mea – The Lord is my light – the motto of the University of Oxford appears (left) on the University’s coat of arms; Trinity college Cambridge (right), named after the holy trinity – “College of the Holy and Undivided Trinity within the Town and University of Cambridge of King Henry the Eighth’s foundation”

Referring to subjectivity, Durkheim asked “what is more open to derailment, from one moment to the next, whimsically or in the cold light of observable fact? – what is more fleeting and difficult to observe than subjective experience/belief? Yet no sane person – not even a scientist – would with honesty and conviction tell that the subjective experiences and beliefs – realized by them – are not real”. In his search for a scientific understanding of religion, he asked – by what method(s) may science observe the objects of religion, and thus understand them as real? A fascinating question leading from this is whether or not, or perhaps better, to what extent the performance of the methods (rites) of fundamental particle physics realizes the nature that is empirically observed?

“To leave belief unexamined is to gain a mentally incompetent human” – “Without human imagining beyond reality as the senses show it, science would be impossible.”
– Durkheim

Duality of the Sacred and the Mundane
The idea that correctly performed rites produce desired results, automatically – without divine intervention – is widespread among cults. Explaining the primary importance of the physical aspects of ceremonies that nearly all cults recognize. “Religious formalism … arises from the fact that, having in and of themselves the source of their efficacy, the formulas to be pronounced and the movements to be executed would lose efficacy if they were not exactly the same as those that had already proved successful.” – This statement is highly reminiscent of the formalism intrinsic to modern scientific methodology. A specific experimental protocol is strictly adhered to precisely because it has proven effective. A scientific discipline may thus be identified as a cult that propagates a certain core set of unchanging rites. Of course, this is not to say that the cults do not develop over time, or that specific rites associated with them are not adapted to changing environmental conditions – the conditions may change, the truth does not – both Religion and Science are complex, adaptive systems of social behavior.

As we shall see during an exposé of pre-scientific, classical and ancient worldviews, what we now distinguish as religion and science were once held to be one and the same pursuit, one and the same knowledge, and both as well as their off-shoots have been suggested as political corruptions of a single, ancient, orally transferred knowledge predating written language – the prisca sapientia.

Durkheim taught that rites do not necessitate gods, indeed, some rites are understood to derive gods – “Not all religious virtues emanate from divine personalities … thus religion is broader than the idea of gods or spirits and so cannot be defined exclusively in those terms.” Regarding the sacred and the profane, both Durkheim and Malinowski spoke of the fundamental duality of the two realms – “the sacred and the profane are always and everywhere conceived by the human intellect as separate genera … while the forms of the contrast are variable, the fact of it is universal.”

The duality of sacredness and profaneness is universally considered to be absolute, thus belonging fully to one is to have fully left the other. From thence, said Durkheim, comes monasticism. “The mind experiences deep repugnance about mingling, even simple contact, between the corresponding things, because the notion of the sacred is always and everywhere separate from the notion of the profane in man’s mind, and because we imagine a kind of logical void between them.”

The mètre des Archives. This object, the useful purpose of which was never mundane, profane measurement, may in Durkheimian terms be understood as a sacred scientific object.

“When a certain number of sacred things have relations of coordination and subordination with one another, so as to form a system that has a certain coherence and does not belong to any other system of the same sort, then the beliefs and rites, taken together, constitute a religion.” Thus, religion may be understood as emerging from a complex interaction of sacred things. The mètre des Archives was an aspect of precisely this kind of complex system, it’s length value equaling 1/10,000,000 of one half of a planetary meridian, the latter (fraction and meridian) are themselves sacred – set apart and untouchable.

Even though nothing in sense experience seems likely to have suggested the idea of a radical duality, asked Durkheim, why is the essential nature of sacred things different from the essential nature of profane things? – what lead us to perceive the world as two heterogeneous worlds? The reader will surely be aware that fundamental duality may be demonstrated physically, by observation of quanta, and even by conglomerates of material at the microscopic scale. This apparent fact is deeply mysterious and not easily understood – in fact, not understood – in the context of modern science. Perhaps we envision reality as fundamentally dual as a result of our neural architecture? The left and right hemispheres of our brains are each essentially different, albeit interconnected, processors. Perhaps then, the universe is fundamentally one whole system, and duality is perceptually apparent as a result of the structural duality of our brains? With this idea in mind, we may pose an interesting question:
Do biological systems such as bacteria, fungi, plants, insects, even entire forests – all of which may be defined as acting socially and intelligently without brains – perceive reality as dual or singular?

Notes – Part I
A) It seems prudent to put the issue of supernature out of our path of investigation as definitively as possible. To this end, it should be said that we cannot even imagine a supernatural phenomenon, because any such imagination would necessarily occur within the physical and thus natural frame of a mind, or minds – thus, any presumed supernatural subject being imagined is necessarily part of material reality, and so must be natural. Subjects, whether observed empirically or unempirically (via imagination) are real, physically-mediated natural phenomena, upon which we may individually and/or collectively reflect and act.

B) In the case of primary producers, specifically phototrophs, though photons may be formalized within the bounds of theoretical physics as material (massive), it may be easier to understand that photons are physically and causally linked to energetic exchanges occurring within the materials of the photosynthetic apparatus.

Bibliography – Part I
1) E. Durkheim, “The Elementary Forms of Religious Life” (1912), translated by K. Fields (1995), The Free Press – Simon & Schuster Inc.,

2) B. Malinowski (edited by R. Redfield), “Magic Science and Religion and Other Essays”, (1948), The Free Press, PDF available:

3) P. Humphreys, “How Properties Emerge”, (1997), Philosophy of Science 64, p. 1-17, Word doc. available,

4) Sir J. Frazer, The Golden Bough, (1854-1941), PDF available via The Project Gutenberg:

5) A. Trewavas, “Aspects of Plant Intelligence”, (2003), Annals of Botany, vol. 92, p. 1-20, PDF available:

6) R. Sessions, “Deep Ecology versus Ecofeminism”, (1991), Hypatia, Vol. 6, No. 1, p. 90-107,

7) G. Sessions, “The Deep Ecology Movement: A Review”, (1987), Environmental Review, Vol. 11, No. 2, p.105-125,


Sociophysics – The last science

‘Truth’ is context-dependent
In context of my studies to date, and in particular my newfound understanding of the common good, I have experienced a surprising insight. I can best describe the occurrence as a spontaneous emergence, in my mind, of a conception of sociophysical phenomena. I was not yet aware of sociophysics and thought that I had coined the term to help define a path of study. Simply, I wanted a word to help me focus more closely upon the physical phenomena that emerge from social interactions. Searching for the literature of sociophysics, I was initially surprised to find a sparse population of recent mathematical probabilistic treatments and models, stemming from quantum physics early in the twentieth century, game theory in the mid-twentieth century, and analyses of computer modeling of adaptive networks early in our twenty-first century. My search soon led me near to the origin of the sociophysical concept – an absolute origin escapes me, though sociophysics seems closely tied to Aristotelian animism. Nevertheless, I now realize that sociophysics has presented itself in a variety of apparitions to many a kindred spirit. If it is a science, then it is the strangest, vaguest, and widest of them – indeed, it has been called “the science that comes after all the others” – and fascinatingly, the men who have studied it knowingly, were and for the greatest part still are outcast by orthodoxy. I certainly am no stranger to their ranks, perhaps that is part of the reason why I feel a sense of familiarity and belonging among the concepts exposed in the current exploration of ‘the last science’.

Previously, I have argued that abstract modeling (theorizing) simplifies reality, allowing only fractionated (quantized), and thus unreal understandings. Historically, fractionation (specialization; division of labor) has been the cost of good quality knowledge. In The Common Good: Part I, I have introduced Robert Rosen, a theoretical biologist who suggested that studies of biology would bring new knowledge to physics, and would change our understanding of science in a broad manner. The study and modeling of complex systems appears to drive in this direction; by my intuitive reckoning, increasingly complex modeling (interaction of theories) approaches ever closer to a good quality representation of reality, and thus a truer understanding of reality. It is for this reason that I have chosen to focus the current exploration upon the histories [NOTE A] of understanding and modeling of social interaction, which shall lead us to an integrated understanding of the current state of the art.

Two classes
Abstract: The abstract form of sociophysics is fundamentally dependent upon human knowledge, which has been composed of necessarily subjective experiences (observations) of an assumed objective reality. It is a science stemming from and attempting to formalize intuitive understandings of social phenomena, by use of mathematical tools developed and used in statistical physics.

Real: We must assume that in reality the physical phenomena that emerge from social interaction are independent of human knowledge; that they occur regardless of observation. Sociophysical phenomena are synergistic (non-additive effects resulting from individual acts) manifestations of the dynamic, physical interaction, consequence and feedback, occurring among networked actors. Examples of phenomena that emerge from social interaction include: ant and termite colonies, bacterial colonies, cities, brains, genetic networks, mycelial networks, glial networks, multicellular organisms, ecosystems, physical and abstracted knowledge, road systems, postal systems, the world wide web (internet).

A true false start: true within context of the me-generation; false within a deeper historical context
Galam (2004) tells us that during the late 1970’s statistical physics was gripped by the theory of phase transitions.(1) In 1982, despite the scandal of a university faculty’s retraction of researchers’ academic freedom due to political fears of institutional disrepute, S. Galam et al managed to publish a set of assumed “founding papers” on Sociophysics.(2) In reference to the first in the set, Galam himself comments that “in addition to modeling the process of strike in big companies using an Ising ferromagnetic model in an external reversing uniform field, the paper contains a call to the creation of Sociophysics. It is a manifesto about its goals, its limits and its danger. As such, it is the founding paper of Sociophysics although it is not the first contribution per se to it.” During the following decade, Galam published a series of papers on Sociophysics, to which he received no feedback. He tells of other physicists “turning exotic” during the mid-nineties, developing the closely related Econophysics, the purpose of which was to analyze financial data. Econophysics quickly gave rise to the so called “quants” of Wall Street – young physicists who were employed by investment bankers to develop algorithms allowing for the trading of complex derivatives, the abuse of which, by the pathological social milieu of the international finance trade, was responsible for the global economic crisis of 2008. Fully fifteen years after his initial publications and the assumed inception of the science of Sociophysics, Galam claimed some gratification in the recognition that a “few additional physicists at last started to join along it”. I deeply sympathize with his statement: “I was very happy to realize I was not crazy, or at least not the only one.” Nevertheless, Galam was and remains incorrect in regard to his position in the history of sociophysics; a history that began centuries before the me-generation.

Reading Galam’s personal testimony, I felt a crystallization of my intuition that the institutionalized position of a careering academic scientist makes for a very poor springboard from which to develop novel ideas and concepts, even if, as in Galam’s case, the ideology is not actually novel. Indeed, I myself have felt, and seen in colleagues, active restraint from pursuing interesting, albeit unorthodox ideas while bound by the rites of the ivory tower. Shameful though this situation is, it certainly is not a modern problem.

Halley, Quetelet and Comte
In his review of the sociophysics literature, Stauffer (2012) reports that the idea of applying knowledge of physical phenomena to studies of social behavior reaches at least two millennia into the past, naming a Sicilian, Empedokles, as the first to suggest that people behave like fluids: some people mix easily like water and wine, while others, like water and oil, do not mix.(3) Vague and philosophical, I hesitate to categorize this conception as sociophysics, though admittedly it does attempt at least metaphorically to fuse social and physical phenomena. Rather more accurate examples of sociophysics were Halley’s calculations of celestial mechanics and annuity rates, Quetelet’s Physique Sociale, and Comte’s Sociophysics. Let us now step through these chronologically.

Edmund Halley

In 1682 Edmund Halley had computed an elliptical orbit for an object visible to the naked eye; a conglomerate of rock and ice, now known as Halley’s comet. He reasoned that it was the same comet as the one reported 75 years earlier, in 1607.(4) He communicated his opinion and calculations to Sir Isaac Newton, who disagreed on account of both the geometry of the object’s orbit and it’s reoccurrence. Nevertheless confident of his theory, Halley predicted that the object would reappear after his death, in 1759; he was proven correct by the comet’s timely visit. Since then, the orbital path followed by Halley’s comet has been confirmed as elliptical, passing beyond Neptune before returning to the vicinity of Earth and Sun with an average periodicity of 75 to 76 years, with variational extremes of 74 and 79 years due to the gravitational perturbations of giants Jupiter and Saturn.

Astronomy, massive bodies and gravitation are relevant to our exploration of sociophysics for three reasons to be expounded later. For the time being, it is important to point-out a fact about Halley that is much less recognized, though possibly more easily recognized as relevant to our current exploration.

In 1693 Halley constructed a mortality table from individual dates of birth and death; data collected by the German city of Breslau. Based upon this tabulation Halley went on to calculate annuity rates for three individuals. In his application of probability theory to social reality – now known as the actuarial profession – it seems Halley had been preceded, in 1671, by a Dutchman, Johannes de Wit. Though again, to his credit, Halley was the first man to correctly calculate annuity rates, based upon correct probabilistic principles.

Adolphe Quetelet

Adolphe Quetelet was a Belgian astronomer and teacher of mathematics, a student of meteorology, and of probability theory; the latter leading to his study of social statistics in 1830. Stigler (1986) tells us that astronomers had used the ‘law of error’ derived from probability theory to gain more accurate measurements of physical phenomena.(5) Quetelet argued that probabilistic theory could be applied to human beings, so rendering the average physical and intellectual features of a population, by sampling “the facts of life”. A graphical plot of sampled quantities renders a normal distribution and the Gaussian bell-shaped curve, hence the “average man” is determined at the normal position. In theory, individual characteristics may then be gauged against an average, “normal character”. Quetelet also suggested the identification of patterns common to both, normal and abnormal behaviors, thus Quetelet’s “social mechanics” assumed a mapping of human physical and moral characteristics, allowing him to formulate the argument that probability influences the course of human affairs, and thus that the human capacity for free-will – or at least the capacity to act upon free-will – is reduced, while social determinism is increased. Quetelet believed that statistical quantities of measured physical and mental characteristics were not just abstract ideas, but real properties representative of a particular people, a nation or ‘race’. In 1835, he published A Treatise on Man, and the Development of His Faculties, and so endowed to the culture of nineteenth century Europe a worldview of racial differences, of an “average man” for each subspecies of Homo sapiens, and hence scientific justification (logical soundness) for slavery and apartheid. Furthermore, Quetelet’s “average man” was presented as an ideal type, with deviations from the norm identified as errors.

Auguste Comte

Between 1830 and 1842 Auguste Comte formulated his Course of Positive Philosophy (CPP). From within our modern ‘global’ cultural milieu it is difficult to appreciate how widely accepted (‘globalized’) the ideology of positive philosophy was two hundred years ago, during the height of Eurocentric colonial culture, as positivism has received virtually no notice since the re-organizational events [NOTE B] imposed upon the politico-economic and cultural affairs of Europe after the Russian revolution and first world war.(6) The eclipse of positivistic ideology began with neo-positivism in philosophy of science, which lead to post-positivism. Strangely, it appears that the two later schools (neo- and post-positivism) have forgotten both, positive philosophy itself and the man who initiated and defended it, and even coined the term positivism [NOTE C]. However, Bourdeau (2014) tells that Comtean studies have seen “a strong revival” in the past decade, with agreement between modern philosophers of science and sociologists upon the ideologies propagated over 170 years ago. Points which were well established in positivism, but subsequently forgotten, have re-emerged in the modern philosophical milieu.

Re-emergent ‘truths’:
i) Scientific justification (logical soundness) is context-dependent.
ii) Science has a social dimension; science is necessarily a social activity with vertical (inter-generational) as well as horizontal (intra-generational) connections and thus also epistemic influences. Simply, science is a human activity, and humans are social animals.
iii) Positive philosophy is not philosophy of science, but philosophy of social interaction; Aristotelian political philosophy. Also, positivism does not separate philosophy of science from political philosophy.
iv) Cooperative wholeness; unity of acts and thoughts; unity of genes and memes; unity of dynamism and state.

“Being deeply aware of what man and animals have in common, Comte […] saw cooperation between men as continuous with phenomena of which biology gives us further examples.”
– Bourdeau (2014)

Comte made the purpose of CPP clear: “Now that the human mind has grasped celestial and terrestrial physics, – mechanical and chemical; organic physics, both vegetable and animal, – there remains one science, to fill up the series of sciences of observation, – Social physics. This is what men have now most need of: and this it is the principal aim of the current work to establish”.(7) He continued, saying that “it would be absurd to pretend to offer this new science at once in a complete state. [Nevertheless, Sociophysics will possess the same characteristic of positivity exposed in all other sciences.] This once done, the philosophical system of the moderns will in fact be complete, as there will be no phenomenon which does not naturally enter into some one of the five great categories. All our fundamental conceptions having become homogeneous, the Positive state will be fully established. It can never again change its character, though it will be forever in course of development by additions of new knowledge.”

In 1832 Comte was named tutor of analysis and mechanics at École Polytechnique. However, during the following decade he experienced two unsuccessful candidacies for professorship; he began to see ties severed between himself and the academic establishment after releasing a preface to CPP. In 1843 he published Elementary Treatise on Analytic Geometry, then in 1844 Discourse on the Positive Spirit, as a preface to Philosophical Treatise on Popular Astronomy (also 1844). By this time he was at odds with the academic establishment – essentially Comte had dropped-out of university. The reason for this does not seem to have been due to a lack of curiosity, neither to a lack of capacity, nor imagination, nor vision, nor even a simple lack of effort. Indeed, the situation resonates strongly with Einstein’s early academic situation, with Dirac’s late academic situation, and with Binet’s life-long academic situation. Galam’s experiences during the early 1980’s reverberate the same, unfortunate, if not pathological phenomenon of academic institution – interesting and curious, broad-reaching minds are generally met with hostile opposition from a fearful and mediocre orthodoxy.

Comte’s second great work – often referred to in the literature as Comte’s second career, was written between 1851 and 1854. It was regarded by Comte himself as his seminal work, and was titled First System of Positive Polity (FSPP). Its goal was a politico-economic reorganization of society, in accordance with scientific methods (techniques for investigating phenomena based upon gathering observable, empirical and measurable evidence, subject to inductive and deductive logical reasoning and argument), with the purpose of increasing the wellbeing of humankind – i.e. adaptation of political life based upon political episteme with the purpose of increasing the common good. This is precisely the Aristotelean argument (see The Common Good: Part I, under the heading Politikos). Though the sciences (epistemes) collectively played a central role in FSPP, positivism is not just science. Rather, with FSPP Comte placed the whole of positive philosophy under the ‘continuous dominance of the heart’, with the motto ‘Love as principle, order as basis, progress as end’. Bourdeau (2014) ensures us that this emphasis “was in fact well motivated and […] characteristic of the very dynamics of Comte’s thought”, though it seems as anathema to the current worldview as it did for Comte’s contemporaries, who “judged severely” – admirers of CPP turned against Comte, and publicly accused him of insanity.

Much like Nikola Tesla, Comte is reported to have composed, argued, and archived for periods of decades, periodically ‘observing the function of’ his systematic works, all in his mind. His death, in 1857, came too early for him to draft works that he had announced 35 years prior:
Treatise of Universal Education – intended for publishing in 1858;
System of Positive Industry, or Treatise on the Total Action of Humanity on the Planet – planned for 1861;
Treatise of First Philosophy – planned for 1867.

Polyhistornauts predicted
“Early academics did not create regular divisions of intellectual labour. Rather, each student cultivated an holistic understanding of the sciences. As knowledge accrued however, science bifurcated, and students devoted themselves to a single branch of the tree of human knowledge. As a result of these divisions of labor – the focused concentration of whole minds upon a single department – science has made prodigious advances in modernity, and the perfection of this division is one of the most important characteristics of Positive philosophy. However, while admitting the merits of specialization, we cannot be blind to the eminent disadvantages which emerge from the limitation of minds to particular study”.(7)

In surprising harmony with my own thoughts and words, Comte opined “it is inevitable that each [specialist] should be possessed with exclusive notions, and be therefore incapable of the general superiority of ancient students, who actually owed that general superiority to the inferiority of their knowledge. We must consider whether the evil [of specialization] can be avoided without losing the good of the modern arrangement; for the evil is becoming urgent. […] The divisions which we establish between the sciences are, though not arbitrary, essentially artificial. The subject of our researches is one: we divide it for our convenience, in order to deal the more easily with its difficulties. But it sometimes happens – and especially with the most important doctrines of each science – that we need what we cannot obtain under the present isolation of the sciences, – a combination of several special points of view; and for want of this, very important problems wait for their solution much longer than they otherwise need to”.(7)

Comte thus proposed “a new class of students, whose business it shall be to take the respective sciences as they are, determine the spirit of each, ascertain their relations and mutual connection, and reduce their respective principles to the smallest number of general principles.”

While reading this passage I was struck by the obvious similarity of its meaning to my own situation. I remain dumbfounded and humbled by the scale of foresight, so lucidly expressed by this great mind. For Comte had not simply suggested multi-disciplinary study, but a viewing though, and faithful acceptance of the general meanings rendered by the various scientific disciplines, together allowing for an intuitive, ‘heartfelt’ condensation of human knowledge.

Five fundamental sciences:
1) Mathematics
2) Astronomy
3) Physics
4) Chemistry
5) Biology

Sociology, then, is the sixth and final science. Each of these may be seen as a node in the network of human knowledge. Sociology, according to Comte, is the body of knowledge which will eventually allow for the networking of all human epistemes into a great unified field of human ideas.

Generalization: uneasy unification
Generalizing the laws of “active forces” (energy) and of statistical mechanics, Comte suggested that the same principle of interaction is true for celestial bodies and for molecules. Specifically, the center of gravity of either a planet or a molecule is focused upon a geometrical point, and though massive bodies may interact with each other dynamically, thus affecting each others relative position and velocity, the center of gravity of each is conserved as a point-state.

“Newton showed that the mutual action of the bodies of any system, whether of attraction, impulsion, or any notion other, – regard being had to the constant equality between action and reaction, – cannot in any way affect the state of the center of gravity; so that if there were no accelerating forces besides, and if the exterior forces of the system were deduced to instantaneous forces, the center of gravity would remain immovable, or would move uniformly in a right line. D’Lambert generalized this property, and exhibited it in such a form that every case in which the motion of the center of gravity has to be considered may be treated as that of a singular molecule. It is seldom that we form an idea of the entire theoretical generality of such great results as those of rational Mechanics. We think of them as relating to inorganic bodies, or as otherwise circumscribed, but we cannot too carefully remember that they apply to all phenomena whatever; and in virtue of this universality alone is the basis of all real science.”
– It should not escape the reader’s attention that in this passage Comte has effectively, albeit figuratively, plotted a graph of dynamically interacting point-states. The interactivity and cooperativity of massive bodies within a solar system or chemical reactants within a flask, both represent physically complex systems of dynamic social interaction – i.e. both are sociophysical systems. Implicit in this epistemological condensation is the fact that sociophysical systems are not necessarily alive, or biotic, or even organic.

After the completion of FSPP and his complete break with orthodox academia, Comte is said to have “overcome modern prejudices”, allowing him to “unhesitatingly rank art above science”.(6) Like Comte, I take the Aristotelian view that the arts are combinations of knowledge and skill; habitus and praxis; theory and method. Thus in a very real and practical sense the sciences are arts, from which it logically follows that Art ranks above Science. A rather more difficult pill to swallow, has been Comte’s Religion of Humanity, which he founded in 1849. Like Bourdeau (2014), I believe “this aspect of Comte’s thought deserves better than the discredit into which it has fallen”. My personal stance is due specifically to a previous uncomfortable encounter with an article on the topic of common goods, which was published by The Journal of Religious Ethics under the auspices of the United Nations(8). I had hesitated to include the paper and its contents in my previous work, due simply to fear – a fear reprimand by my peers, and a personal fear of straying from the “scientifically correct and peer reviewed path of learning”. As will become obvious, I have since realized that exclusion of study materials on the basis of fear alone is unreasonable, and that I should, and shall, attempt a rather more inclusive, better rounded education; critical thinking and good quality arguments remain of utmost importance.

“Reforms of society must be made in a determined order: one has to change ideas, then morals, and only then institutions.”
– Comte (cca. 1840)

The Religion of Humanity was defined with neither God(s) nor supernatural forces – as a “state of complete harmony peculiar to human life […] when all the parts of Life are ordered in their natural relations to each other […] a consensus, analogous to what health is for the body”. Personally, I understand this concept as the Tao, and more recently as deep ecology; inclusive of humanity but not exclusive to it. For Comte however, worship, doctrine and moral fortitude were oriented solely toward humanity, which he believed “must be loved, known, and served”.

Three components associated with the positivist religion:
i) Worship – acts; praxis; methods.
ii) Doctrine – knowledge; habitus; theories.
iii) Discipline (moral fortitude) – self-imposed boundaries, simultaneously conforming to, affirming, and defining the system of belief.

Two existential functions of the positivist religion:
i) Moral function – via which religion governs an individual.
ii) Political function – via which religion unites a population.

Ghetto magnetism
In this section we begin to explore the modern science of macro-scale physical phenomena, which result from micro-scale social interactions. The reader may find it useful to refer to the appended glossary of terms [NOTE D].

During the birthing period of quantum mechanical theory, “the concept of a microscopic magnetic model consisting of elementary [atomic] magnetic moments, which are only able to take two positions “up” and “down” was created by Wilhelm Lenz”.(9) Lenz proposed that spontaneous magnetization in a ferromagnetic solid may be explained by interactions between the potential energies of neighboring atoms. Between 1922 and 1924, Ernst Ising, a student of Lenz, studied the Lenz model of ferromagnetism, as a one-dimensional chain of magnetic moments; each atom’s field interacting with its closest neighbors. Ising’s name seems to have become attached to the Lenz model by accident, in a 1936 publication, titled On Ising’s Model of Ferromagnetism.

Ernst Ising

Three energetic components of the Ising model:
i) Interaction between neighboring magnetic moments (atomic spins).
ii) Entropic forcing (temperature).
iii) Action of an externally applied magnetic field, affecting all individual spins.

Social interaction between neighboring atoms induces parallel alignment of their magnetic momenta, resulting in a more favorable energetic situation (lower entropy) when neighbors are self-similar; both +1, or both −1. Conversely, a less favorable situation results from opposing momenta (+1 next to −1).(10)

Example of a the Ising model on a two dimensional (10 x 10) lattice. Each arrow represents a spin, which represents a magnetic moment that points either up (-1, black) or down (+1, red). The model is initially configured as a ‘random’ distribution of spin vectors.

The same initial ‘random’ distribution of magnetic moments, showing ‘unfavorable’ alignments (circled in green).

Clusters of spins begin to form (positive clusters circled in green, negative clusters circled in yellow) as a result of neighbor interaction, temperature, and the action of an externally applied magnetic field. As a result of entropy-reducing vector flipping, new ‘unfavorable’ spin alignments arise (circled in light blue), which will also tend to flip polarity.

In sociology, the term tipping point(11) refers to a rapid and dramatic change in group behavior – i.e. the adoption by the general population of a behavior that was rare prior to the change. The term originated in physics, where it refers to the addition of a small weight to a balanced object (a system previously in equilibrium), causing the object to topple or break, thus affecting a large scale change in the object’s stable state (a change of the system’s equilibrium); a change of stable state is also known as a phase transition.

The relation between cause and effect is usually abrupt in complex systems. A small change in the neighborhood of a subsystem can trigger a large-scale, or even global reaction. “The [network] topology itself may reorganize when it is not compatible with the state of the nodes”
– Juan Carlos González Avella (2010)

In relation to social phenomena, Morton Grodzins is credited with having first used the term tipping point during his 1957 study of racial integration in American neighborhoods.(11) Grodzins learned that the immigration of “black” households into a previously “white” neighborhood was generally tolerated by inhabitants as long as the ratio of black to white households remained low. If the ratio continued to rise, a critical point was reached, resulting in the en masse emigration of the remaining white households, due to their perception that “one too many” black households populated the neighborhood. Grodzins dubbed this critical point the tipping point; sociologist Mark Granovetter labeled the same phenomenon the threshold model of collective behavior.

Between 1969 and 1972, economist Thomas Schelling published articles on the topic of racial dynamics, specifically segregation. Expanding upon the work of Grodzins, Schelling suggested the emergence of “a general theory of tipping”. It is said that Schelling used coins on a graph paper lattice to demonstrate his theory, placing ‘pennies’ (copper-alloy one cent pieces, representing African-American households) and ‘dimes’ (nickel-alloy ten cent pieces – representing Caucasian households) in a random distribution, while leaving some free places on the lattice. He then moved the pieces one by one, based upon whether or not an individual ‘household’ was in a “happy situation” – i.e. a Moore neighborhood, in which the nearest eight neighbors are self-similar.(12) At random, one self-dissimilar ‘household’ was moved to a Moore neighborhood, over time rendering a complete segregation of households, even with low valuation of individual neighbor preferences. In 1978 Schelling published a book titled Micromotives and Macrobehavior, in which he helped to explain variation in normative differences, tending over time to display a self-sustaining momentum of segregation. In 2005, aged 84, Schelling was awarded a share in the 2005 Nobel prize in economics, for analyses of game theory, leading to increased understandings of conflict and cooperation.(13)

Thomas Schelling

“People get separated along many lines and in many ways. There is segregation by sex, age, income, language, religion, color, taste, accidents of historical location. Some segregation results from the practices of organizations; some is deliberately organized; and some results from the interplay of individual choices that discriminate. Some of it results from specialized communication systems, like different languages. And some segregation is a corollary of other modes of segregation: residence is correlated with job location and transport”.(14)
– Schelling (1971)

Under the heading Linear Distribution, in Schelling’s 1971 publication on the subject of social segregation, we find a direct analog to the original one-dimensional Lenz-Ising model. Schelling seems to have either appropriated the concept, citing neither Lenz nor Ising, or to have designed the model independently. His involvement in American foreign policy, national security, nuclear strategy, and arms control(13) certainly would have granted Schelling access to knowledge of theoretical works, including the so called Monte Carlo methods, undertaken at Los Alamos during and after the second world war.(15) However, for the purpose of our current exploration it is irrelevant how exactly Schelling arrived at his understanding, and indeed, as I have mentioned previously, sociophysics has emerged in a variety of apparitions, to studious individuals with widely differing perspectives.

“The line of stars and zeros […] corresponds to the odd and even digits in a column of random numbers. […] We interpret these stars and zeros to be people spread out in a line, each concerned about whether his neighbors are stars or zeros. […] Suppose, now, that everybody wants at least half his neighbors to be like himself, and that everyone defines ‘his neighborhood’ to include the four nearest neighbors on either side of him. […] I have put a dot over each individual whose neighborhood does not meet his demands. […] A dissatisfied member moves to the nearest point at which half his neighbors will be like himself at the time he arrives there. […] Two things happen as they move. Some who were content will become discontent, because like members move out of their neighborhoods or opposite members move in. And some who were discontent become content, as opposite neighbors move away or like neighbors move close. The rule will be that any originally discontented member who is content when his turn comes will not move after all, and anyone who becomes discontent in the process will have his turn after the 26 original discontents have had their innings.”
– Schelling (1971)

Under the heading Area Distribution, Schelling (1971) introduces a two dimensional (13 x 16) lattice, commenting that “patterning – departure from randomness – will prove to be characteristic of integration, as well as of segregation, if the integration results from choice and not chance.” Clearly, Shelling’s model of social segregation bares great similarity to Ising’s ferromagnetic model.

Stauffer (2012) reminds us that the formation of urban ghettos is a well known phenomenon, and suggests that New York’s Harlem is the most famous black district,(3) with a history stretching well over a hundred years. From 1658, Harlem was a Dutch settlement (or ghetto) named after the capitol of north Holland. African-Americans began to immigrate during the ‘great migration’, from about 1905, when former slaves from rural southern United States migrated to mid-western, north-eastern and western regions of the US. Harlem identified as a ‘black’ district in a Manhattan borough, during the early 1920s.

Indirectly, Stauffer poses an interesting question: Why is it that we spontaneously self-organize into groups of self-similar individuals? – or in the specific case of “ghetto formation” – Why is it that we like to live in communities of like-minded, ethnically and culturally similar individuals? The simplest and clearest answer to this question is surely that we are social animals, and that it is easier to socialize with self-similar individuals, than with strangers. However, stemming from this is the truly fascinating question: If it is true that we like to live in communities of self-similar individuals, then why do we not like to live in communities of self-similar individuals when forced to do so? As an example of the latter, Stauffer reminds us of the uprising, in 1943, of the Warsaw Ghetto, which did not self-assemble but was formed under command of Nazi Germany. Again, the simplest and clearest answer must be that we are social animals, though I cannot think of good reason in support of this example, other than revolutionary pressure due to innate principles of self-regulation and self-organization. Regardless, it would be nice to assume that precisely this kind of ambiguity, apparently intrinsic to sociology, has been at root of the epistemological rift between physics and sociology, as the result of a long-standing ideological tradition in physics of determinism. In reality, a deeper and rather more vexing explanation haunts us; it has become obvious that the ambiguity of social interaction is not restricted to messy life systems, but governs inorganic physical phenomena also.

Statistical physics, borne of quantum theory, has put a definitive end to physical determinism. The renormalization technique, ushered in during the mid-1970’s, seems to have been an attempt to conserve physical determinism, at least tentatively. However, renormalization is a theoretical hack – an attempt to abstractly force fundamentally complex, infinite, random, and thus fundamentally indeterminate phenomena to appear as if they were simple, precisely calculable, determinable facts. Physically, experimentally, reality is not clear. In fact, reality is fundamentally uncertain, and so remains non-understood; mysterious. Stauffer confirms the validity of Comte’s thoughts, suggesting that “cooperation of physicists with sociologists could have pushed research progress by many years”.

State of the Art
“The concept of Complex Systems has evolved from Chaos, Statistical Physics and other disciplines, and it has become a new paradigm for the search of mechanisms and an unified interpretation of the processes of emergence of structures, organization and functionality in a variety of natural and artificial phenomena in different contexts. The study of Complex Systems has become a problem of enormous common interest for scientists and professionals from various fields, including the Social Sciences, leading to an intense process of interdisciplinary and unusual collaborations that extend and overlap the frontiers of traditional Science. The use of concepts and techniques emerging from the study of Complex Systems and Statistical Physics has proven capable of contributing to the understanding of problems beyond the traditional boundaries of Physics.”
– Juan Carlos González Avella (2010)

In an interdisciplinary review of the literature defining adaptive co-evolutionary networks (AcENs), Gross & Blasius (2007) have listed five dynamical phenomena common to AcENs:
i) emergence of classes of nodes from an initially heterogeneous population
ii) spontaneous division of labor – in my opinion the same as (i)
iii) robust self-organization
iv) formation of complex topologies
v) complex system-level dynamics (complex mutual dynamics in state and topology)

We are to understand that the mechanisms giving rise to these emergent phenomena themselves emerge from the dynamical interplay between state and topology. Divisions of labor, for example, spontaneously emerge (self-organize) as a result of information feedback within an AcEN(16) This fact bolsters an argument that I have made previously, for a strong similarity between the epiphenomena of bacteria, gregarious insects and humans, in their respective cultures. Also supported by studies of AcENs, is my hitherto intuitive understanding that a diverse set of actors is fundamental to the production of common goods. In fact, it is now clear that cultural diversity is so fundamental to the dynamics of social phenomena, that divisions of labor necessarily and spontaneously emerge from an initially homogeneous population, due to random variations of nodal state (entropic forcing), degree and homophily.

Gross & Blasius (2007) have reported that self-organization is observed in Boolean and in biological networks, occurring within a narrow region of transition between an area of chaotic dynamics and a area of stationary dynamics. Metaphorically, one might say that between the vast and chaotic field of the unknown and the relatively large steady state of knowledge, lies a narrow field – a phase space of self-organizing possibility – i.e. intuition. Not at all surprisingly, life systems, like all complex adaptive systems, necessarily occupy this theoretically defined phase space. Further, Gross & Blasius talk of the “ubiquity of adaptive networks across disciplines”, specifying technical distribution networks such as power grids, postal networks and the internet; biological distribution networks such as the vascular systems of animals, plants and fungi; neural or genetic information networks; immune system networks; social networks such as opinion propagation/formation, the social media and market-based socio-economics; ecological networks (food webs), and of course biological evolution offers an historical depth of literature on the subject of AcENs. The authors mention that examples are also reported from chemistry and physics, but do not provide examples. Based upon our current exploration it seems fair to suggest at least the following: astronomical gravitational networks, molecular chemical reactant networks, geological networks (the interactive cycling of carbon, water, nitrogen, minerals, etc…), and of course quantum mechanical networks.

For me personally, the most difficult to fathom of these examples has been the astronomical gravitational network. However, I am now able to imagine the gravitational interaction of massive bodies at their various scales – planets, moons and comets within a solar system; solar systems within a galaxy; galaxies within local groups; local groups within clusters, etc – as nodes, with gravitation comprising the set of edges (connections) between massive bodies.

Network geometry is obvious in models of Universal mass distribution.

Tabulated nomenclature of static and dynamic elements, for a selection of epistemes.

Metaphysics actor action
Graph theory node edge
Complex systems theory vertex link
Quantum theory particle wave
Electro dynamics theory field vector
Economic theory agent behavior
Astrophysics massive body gravitation
Chemistry reactant reaction
Molecular biology – central doctrine DNA transcription
Molecular biology – central doctrine mRNA translation
Biology organism survival
Evolutionary theory species adaptation

According to J. Avella (2010), the modeling of network dynamics has revealed a complex relationship between actor heterogeneity and the emergence of diverse cultural groups.(19) Network structure and cultural traits co-evolve, rendering qualitatively distinct network regions or phases. Put in more familiar terms: patterns of social interaction and processes of social influence change or differ in tandem, also network patterns and processes feedback upon each other. Thus social interactions exist as a dynamic flux in which distinct channels of interactivity form, sever, and re-form. From the collective interaction of agents, emerge temporary, sequential, non-equilibria – known as network states. The formation of network states is controlled by early-forming actors, whereas the later formation and continued rapid reformation of cultural domains, comprises the geometry – or ‘architecture’ – of a mature network; a network who’s dynamics have reached a dynamic steady state.

Furthermore, the ordered state of a finite system under the action of small perturbations is not a fixed, homogeneous configuration, but rather a dynamic and diversified, chaotic steady state. During the long term, such a system sequentially “visits” a series of monocultural configurations; one might imagine a systemic analogue to serial monogamy. Slow forming monocultures emerge under stable environmental conditions (low entropic forcing). Under less stable environmental conditions (high entropic forcing), monocultural domains undergo fragmentation and are replaced by a variety of rapidly forming and re-forming cultural domains, thus rendering a dynamic steady state. The relation between cause and effect is usually abrupt in complex systems. Indeed, “the [network] topology itself may reorganize when it is not compatible with the state of the nodes.”

Avella tells of a study by Y. Shibanai et al, published in 2001, analysing the effects of global mass media upon social networks. Shibanai et al assumed global mass media messages as an external field of influence – analogous to the external magnetic field in the Ising model – with which network actors (individual, and/or groups of nodes in a network) interact. The external field was interpreted “as a kind of global information feedback acting on the system”. Two mechanisms of interactive affect upon society by global media were identified:
i) The influential power of the global media message field is equal to that of real (local) neighbors.
ii) Neighbourly influence is filtered by feedback of global information, but effected only if and/or when an individual network node is aligned with a global media message.
Shibanai et al concluded that “global information feedback facilitates the maintenance of cultural diversity” – i.e. The propagation of messages promoting a state of global order and cultural unity, simultaneously enables and maintains a dynamic steady state of global disorder and multiculturalism.

Generally, considerations of equilibrium assume that the application of a field enhances order in a system. However, this is not always the case. To the contrary, Avella (2010) tells us that “an ordered state different from the one imposed by the external field is possible, when long-range interactions are considered” and fascinatingly, that “a spatially nonuniform field of interaction may actually produce less disorder in the [social] system than a uniform field.”

“While trends toward globalization provide more means of contact between more people, these same venues for interaction also demonstrate the strong tendency of people to self-organize into culturally defined groups, which can ultimately help to preserve overall diversity.”
– J. Avella (2010)

Respectfully, I urge the reader to allow themselves a few moments of meditation upon this rather subversive finding.

A dynamic steady state exists in a network until a process of social influence such as an external environmental perturbation or an internal social perturbation, exceeds some threshold (tipping point), as a result of which the current network steady state is eroded and reformation of ongoing network dynamics occurs, rendering a new dynamic steady state. Put another way: above some threshold, a given perturbation causes an abrupt change in social interactions, leading to a new (though ultimately temporary) dynamic steady state. Co-evolution implies that the processes of social influence change as the result of multilateral feedback mechanisms between social interactions, environmental forcing, and/or the eccentric actions of some individual or group.

Three distinct phases of complex (adaptive, co-evolutionary) networks:
Phase I) A large component of the network remains connected and co-evolutionary dynamics lead to a dominant monocultural state.
Phase II) Fragmentation of the monocultural state begins, as various cultural groups form in the dynamic network. However, these smaller groups remain stable in the presence of ongoing stochastic shocks; peripheral actors are either absorbed into a social group or are forced out. “Social niches are not produced through competition or selection pressure but through the mechanisms of homophily and influence in a co-evolutionary process.[…] Thus, even in the absence of selection pressures, a population can self-organize into stable social niches that define its diverse cultural possibilities.”
Phase III) Fragmentation of cultural domains leads to high levels of heterogeneity. Avella (2010) teaches that the very high levels of heterogeneity observed in network models are “empirically unrealistic in most cases; however, they warn of a danger that comes with increasing options for social and cultural differentiation, particularly when the population is small or there is modest cultural complexity. Unlike cultural drift, which causes cultural groups to disappear through growing cultural consensus, a sudden flood of cultural options can also cause cultural groups to disappear; but instead of being due to too few options limiting diversity, it is due to excessive cultural options creating the emergence of highly idiosyncratic individuals who cannot form group identifications or long-term social ties.”

Confirming what we have learned from Ising and Schelling, Avella tells that “[actors] have a preference for interacting with others who share similar traits and practices”, and this fact “naturally diversifies the population into emergent social clusters.” However, we have also learned that a highly idiosyncratic actor, who is either unrecognized or even disconnected from a local area network, may still play an influential role upon the greater network (society). Thus, highly idiosyncratic individuals, devoid of group identifications and/or long-term social ties, rather than posing a danger, may be potentially highly relevant to social processes, if only in the sense that collective idiosyncrasy exists as a reservoir of unused or even unknown options and opportunities – a pool of potential, perhaps similar to that of genomic mutants; a diverse set of resources from which may emerge novel solutions to challenges and previously un-encountered situations.

Indeed, precisely this scenario appears to have been the case at the emergence of life on Earth (see: LUCA and the progenotes, in Part II: Empirical observations and meta-analyses, of The Common Good), during which the progenote population represented a collective, albeit semi-disconnected, network of highly idiosyncratic individuals with no strong group identification or long-term social ties. Also learned in Empirical observations and meta-analyses, a local area network catastrophe is catastrophic only for a highly adapted (specialized) monoculture, and may be problematic for small ‘satellite’ cultural groups that are to a lesser extent adapted to the current network topology. However, highly idiosyncratic, even disenfranchised actors in the current dynamic, network steady state, may experience homophilic pressure and thus social connectivity in the dynamic steady state which emerges from a phase transition of the network topology.

Avella (2010) has confirmed that cultural heterogeneity (multicultural dynamics, and even outright anarchy) is a deep aspect of reality. Anarchy and chaos appear to be near the source, or indeed to be the source of physical and social order. That is to say a variety of ordered states spontaneously emerge from anarchical, chaotic systems. “Social diversity can be maintained even in highly connected environments” – i.e. Even under intense pressure to conform, diversification and hence diversity, emerge and persist.

Vinkovic & Kirman (2006), remind us that the purpose of the Schelling model is “to study the collective behavior of a large number of particles”,(16) and that the model illustrates the emergence of aggregate phenomena that are not predictable from the behaviors of individual actors. In economics theory individual agents make decisions based upon a “utility function” (personal preference), an idea that can be interpreted in physical terms, as: particle interactions are driven by changes of internal energy. A direct analogy is made between the interactions of life systems (humans, insects, fungi, plants, bacteria, etc…) and physical systems (gases, liquids, solids, colloids, solutions, etc…) by treating particles as agents. “In the Schelling model utility depends on the number of like and unlike neighbors. In the particle analogue the internal energy depends on the local concentration […] of like or unlike particles. This analogue is a typical model description of microphysical interactions in dynamical physical systems […]. Interactions between particles are governed by potential energies, which result in inter-particle forces driving particles’ dynamics.”

It is understood then, that from the collective behaviour of individual agents, emerge clusters of self-similar agents. Fascinatingly, Vinkovic & Kirman report finding that aggregates of empty space play a “role” in the dynamics of agent clustering; stressing the importance of the number of empty spaces in the initial, random, configuration of an experimental lattice. Specifically, “an increase in the volume of empty space results in more irregular cluster shapes and slower evolution because empty space behaves like a boundary layer”. Clearly, in their analytical study, the authors assume that aggregates of empty space express a “behavior”, thus implying that “empty space” has some capacity to act; specifically, stabilizing nearby clusters by preventing them from direct contact with each other. Simply, we are to acknowledge the collective agency of aggregations of agentless locations on the lattice; the collective action of actorless, “free” space.

Plots of an agent based (Schelling) model.
The two dimensional experimental lattice is composed of (100 x 100) = 10000 cells. Each cell is either empty (white) or is occupied by one agent (red or blue). Numbers of empty cells in initial random configurations are shown.
Increased cluster size correlates with decreased value of x. Increased sizes of empty space clusters are shown (circled in green) for both initial configurations.
– graph adapted from Vinkovic & Kirman (2006)

I have managed to find only a tiny scattering of scientific works attributing some significance to empty space. One example is from the statistical analysis of graphical data plots; Forina et al (2003), have introduced an empty space index, the purpose of which is to quantify the fraction of information space on a given graph, that does not hold any “experimental objects”.(17) However, the authors are careful to point out that the empty space index cannot be confused with a clustering index. Another, perhaps more commonly known example stems from astronomy; voids.

Like Serge Galam, Stephen Wolfram is also a self-proclaimed hobbyist exploring sociophysics. In his philosophical treatment of space-time(18) Wolfram (2015) suggests that “maybe in some sense everything in the universe is just made of space.” Wolfram speaks of what I choose to call aether (see: A Spot of Bother and Aether), saying:
“As it happens, nearly 100 years [before Special Relativity, people] still thought that space was filled with a fluid-like ether. (Ironically enough, in modern times we’re back to thinking of space as filled with a background Higgs field, vacuum fluctuations in quantum fields, and so on.)”

It must be stressed that the epistemic condensation of sociology and physics may be ascribed to any of the periodic elements; to the sub-atomic scale as well as the astronomic scale; to mathematical and theoretical, albeit complex, models of reality; and of course to life systems.

We have viewed through empirically observable phenomena, at some aspect of reality that is more fundamental than those which we have observed.

Critically, this cannot be science, as the absolute boundary of the scientific method, and thus science itself, is empiricism (sensual observation and manipulation). Any thing that we think we see and do beyond or through what we actually observe and affect, is not science. We are left with only one logical possibility: that our newfound knowledge of reality is metaphysical. Ultimately we must categorize it as Art.

A) There are at least three separate histories of sociophysics; one stemming from philosophy, one from quantum physics, and one from sociology.
B) In the vocabulary of complex systems modeling and co-evolutionary adaptive networks theory one may rightly define such reorganizational events as a change of topological dynamics.
C) As well as positivism, Comte coined the words sociology and altruism.(6)
D) Glossary of terms relevant to network models:
Node: The node is the principal unit of a network. A network consists of a number of nodes connected by links. Depending on context, nodes are sometimes also called vertices, agents, actors, or attractors.
Link: A link is a connection between two nodes in a network. Depending on context, links are also called edges, connections, actions or interactions.
Degree: The degree of a node is the number of nodes to which it is connected; i.e. degree = links/node. The mean degree of the network is the mean of the individual degrees of all nodes in the network.
Neighbors: Two nodes are said to be neighbors if they are connected by a link.
Dynamics: Depending on context, dynamics refers to a temporal change of either the state or the topology of a network.
Evolution: Depending on context, evolution refers to a temporal change of either the state or the topology of a network.
Frozen node: A node is said to be frozen if its state does not change in the long-term behavior of the network. In certain systems the state of frozen nodes can change nevertheless on an even longer topological time scale.
Topology: Refers to a specific pattern of connections between the nodes in a network.
State: Depending on context, state refers to either the state of a networked node or the state of the network as a whole – including the nodes and the topology.
Small-world: Refers to a network state in which distant, indirectly connected, nodes are linked via a short average path length.
Scale-free: Refers to a network state in which the distribution of node degrees follows a power law.
Homophily: Refers to spontaneous attraction between self-similar nodes; literally self love.

1) S. Galam, “Sociophysics: a personal testimony”, (2004), Laboratoire des Milieux Désordonnés et Hétérogènes, arXiv,
2) S. Galam, Y. Gefen and Y. Shapir, “Sociophysics: A mean behavior model for the process of strike”, (1982), Journal of Mathematical Sociology, 9, p. 1-13.
3) D. Stauffer, “A Biased Review of Sociophysics”, (2012), Institute for Theoretical Physics, Cologne University, arXiv,
5) S. Stigler, “Adolphe Quetelet (1796-1874)”, (1986) Encyclopedia of Statistical Sciences, John Wiley & Sons,
6) M. Bourdeau, “Auguste Comte”, (2014), Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy,
7) H. Martineau, “The Positive Philosophy of Auguste Comte”, (1896), Batoche Books (2000),
8) J. O’Connor, “MAKING A CASE FOR THE COMMON GOOD IN A GLOBAL ECONOMY: The United Nations Human Development Reports [1990-2001]”, (2002), The Journal of Religious Ethics, Vol. 30, No. 1, p. 155-173,
9) S. Kobe, “Ernst Ising 1900-1998”, (2000), Technische Universität Dresden, Institut für Theoretische Physik,
10) J. Selinger, “Ising Model for Ferromagnetism”, Chapter 2 of Introduction to the Theory of Soft Matter: From Ideal Gasses to Liquid Crystals, (2016),
11) “Tipping point”,
12) D. Vinkovic and A. Kirman, “A physical analogue of the Schelling model”, (2006), Proceedings of the National Academy of Science,
13) “Thomas Schelling”,
14) T. Schelling, “DYNAMIC MODELS OF SEGREGATION”, (1971), Journal of Mathematical Sociology, Vol. 1, p. 143-186,
15) “Monte Carlo method”,
16) T. Gross & B. Blasius, “Adaptive coevolutionary networks: a review”, (2007), Journal of The Royal Society,
17) M. Forina, S. Lanteri, C. Casolino, “Cluster analysis: Significance, empty space, clustering tendency, non-uniformity. II – Empty space index”, (2003),
18) S. Wolfram, “What Is Spacetime, Really?”, (2015),
19) J. Avella, “Coevolution and local versus global interactions in collective dynamics of opinion formation, cultural dissemination and social learning”, (2010), Institute of Interdisciplinary Physics and Complex Systems,

The Common Good: a semi-rational emergent property of complex collective interaction between diverse actors – Part II

The common good invariably requires diversification, manifest as random fluctuations within the biological phase space from which emerge divisions of labour, and thus necessarily, inequalities among individuals comprising a social collective. Entropic forcing drives increases of the common good, via increased diversity, to an apparent limit.

Explorations are made of philosophical (Part I) and empirical (Part II) studies in politics, biology, and economics.

Cooperation via collective divisions of labour is a necessary prerequisite to biological metabolism and reproduction. A collective comprising diverse actors is thus assumed fundamental to the planetary biome. The preponderance of benefit (here designated ‘the common good’) that emerges for actors (individuals and groups), is mediated by Woesean collective cooperation, defined as “a diverse community of cells(note A) surviving and evolving as a biological unit.”(1)
– see Part I for (note A) and reference (1).

“Diversity is an asset with which to confront uncertainty.”
– Groschl, 2013

Part II: Empirical observations and meta-analyses

Diversified-specialized: a modern economical perspective
The concept of diversified specialization is introduced and discussed in some detail by Farhauer & Kröl (2012), in an empirical study of German kreisfreie städte (cities with county status).(28) The study speaks of Marshall-Arrow-Romer (MAR) externalities, and of Jacobs externalities; both are forms of knowledge spillover. The former generating advantages due to specialization in the local environment, the latter generating advantages due to diversification in the local environment.

A diversified sector structure fosters cross-sectoral (‘Jacobs’) spillovers and lessens the impact of sector-specific demand shocks upon the regional economy. However, cities specializing in several sectors profit from both, MAR and Jacobs knowledge spillovers. Diversified-specialised cities combine the benefits of higher productivity due to specialization, with the advantages of a diversified structure, such as cross-fertilization among differing sectors, thus exhibiting higher growth rates than either specialized or diversified cities.

Specialization is risky. When a highly specialized local economy is exposed to a negative demand shock, local unemployment tends to increase dramatically, resulting in a local economic recession, or possibly even leading to an economic, and eventually cultural collapse of the entire region. In an extreme case the industry sector begins to wholly collapse, causing a widespread cascading shockwave.(29)

Sector-specific demand shocks are better absorbed by a diversified economy. It is reasonable to assume that a diversified economic environment, or indeed the diversified skill-set of an individual, generally allows for greater stability; or biologically speaking, greater fitness via increased adaptive capacity. The viability of a culture surely is in the common interest of all individuals comprising it, whether they are directly or indirectly integrated into the local culture (economy and/or ecology). Thus economic and cultural stability (viability) may reasonably be viewed as a common good.

Farhauer & Kröl report that diversified cities are generally larger, more crowded and chaotic, rendering a business environment that is less efficient and more costly than that found in a specialized city. Interestingly then, diversification requires more space than specialization, not simply geographically but also potentially; a larger realm of possibility (a larger phase space) defines diversified actors.

“Smaller cities tend to be specialised and, as a result, more productive which indicates a negative influence of city size on productivity. However, in large cities inputs can be utilised more efficiently – i.e. put to the best possible use – by means of which productivity is higher.”
– Farhauer & Kröl, 2012

Hitting squarely the predictions rendered by the hypothesis upon which the current thesis rests(note F), the diversified-specialized theory appears to be inconclusive and ambiguous, yet it is obvious that if population number (city size) does not make a clear difference in productivity, then a diversified approach is better, if only because it renders a more stable and viable situation for all stakeholders. And indeed Farhauer & Kröl do report that numerous empirical studies correlating regional sector structure (either diversified or specialized) with economic growth, have found greater employment rates in diversified regions. Critically though, the study promotes the concept of ‘diversified-specialization’ as more productive, more innovative and more stable than either diversified or specialist structures are on their own. Thus a “region specializing in a certain combination of related sectors is likely to experience higher growth rates than a region specializing in an unrelated portfolio or in one sector only.”

An indeterminate confusion in the literature relevant to the empirical study of local economies has been reported; some studies concluding that a city is specialized, while others say the same city is diversified. Farhauer & Kröl tell that “many cities exhibit multiple specialisations, but – apart from specialization in a few sectors – they show a diversified structure at the same time.” One could easily assume that Farhauer & Kröl are fence-sitting on their suggestion of diversified-specialized cities. Rather, I would suggest they have taken a pragmatic perspective, indicative of diversity and diversification as fundamental to local economies; that is to say, specializations cannot exist in the absence of diversity, and that specializations emerge from a milieu of diverse actors. Arguably, the same may be said of local ecologies.

Furthering the economy/ecology analogy, the authors tell that “companies benefit from proximity to upstream and downstream firms […]” – a statement that is strikingly reminiscent of biological commensal symbiosis between upstream and downstream metabolisms, and of the current best guess regarding the origin of life on Earth; the constitution of the last universal common ancestor. Most fascinating of all, due to its similarity with the inefficient process of photosynthetic primary production, is the statement “cities with lower productivity levels are characterised by higher growth rates.”

LUCA and the progenotes
The idea that any group of modern organisms inherited their genes from a single common ancestor is naive. Much more likely is that the last universal common ancestor (LUCA) was a complex and diverse, sophisticated global community.(30) Early life forms were particularly promiscuous, sharing their genes in a process called horizontal gene transfer (HGT); moving genetic materials, signals, metabolic components, and other resources between cells without necessarily reproducing the entire cell.

“Most researchers now believe we should think of LUCA as a pool of genes shared among a host of primitive organisms [though] some biologists believe that horizontal gene transfer makes LUCA unknowable.”
– Whitfield, 2004

Whitfield (2004), proposes that individual cellular components of the LUCA collective may have independently learned how to solve similar problems, such as membrane construction, or the extraction of energy from certain organic molecules, and that HGT allowed for promiscuous sharing of genes coding such solutions with other cells in the commune.

The cellular functions of modern organisms rely on complex enzymatic machinery. Generally enzymatic components are encoded by several noncontiguous genes, which may be located in different regions of the genome. In contrast, the earliest genes would each have encoded an enzymatic product able to function as a stand-alone functional module – “like cassettes that can be loaded, removed and replaced. Antibiotic-resistance genes are like that today.”

The darwinian threshold, estimated to have occurred 3.5 billion years ago, represents the point in biological history when inheritance and mutation of genes replaced HGT as the dominant mode of evolution; individual cells became more complex and their functions became less interchangeable.

Carl Woese (1998), proposed that the LUCA was not a discrete entity, but a diverse community of cells surviving and evolving as a collective.(31) “This communal ancestor has a physical history but not a genealogical one. The [LUCA] cannot have been a particular organism, a single organismal lineage. It was communal, a loosely knit, diverse conglomeration of primitive cells that evolved as a unit, and it eventually developed to a stage where it broke into several distinct communities, which in their turn become the three primary lines of descent. – The universal ancestor is not an entity, not a thing. It is a process. Progenotes(note G) were very unlike modern cells. Their component parts had different ancestries, and the complexion of their componentry changed drastically over time. All possessed the machinery for gene expression and genome replication and at least some rudimentary capacity for cell division. But even these common functions had no genealogical continuity, for they too were subject to the confusion of lateral gene transfer. Progenotes are cell lines without pedigrees, without long-term genetic histories. With no organismal history, no individuality or “self-recognition,” progenotes are not “organisms” in any conventional sense.”

Individually, progenotes differed metabolically, their small genomes necessitating individual metabolic simplicity. Collectively however, the diverse and noncontiguous genome of the progenote population was totipotent, and HGT greatly facilitated the spread of innovations through the population, endowing the progenote community with an enormous evolutionary potential.

“not individual cell lines but the community of progenotes as a whole […] survives and evolves”
– Woese, 1989

Glansdorff et al (2008), teach that “the origin of viruses and their possible role in evolution have opened new perspectives on the emergence and genetic legacy of LUCA”.(32) Order and its corollary, organization, have increased during the evolution of biological systems. Complexity remains a rather poorly defined concept, except in the abstract sense of non-computability; irrationality.

Molecular genetic studies have allowed researchers to infer a sophisticated genomic and metabolic capacity for the LUCA. Generally, the view is one of a diversified and promiscuous community, collectively housing a wide spanning genetic redundancy. “It is indeed very likely that most cells in an ancestral community having engendered the diversity of metabolic functions found in the three Domains possessed more than a single copy of every essential gene as well as numerous paralogous genes. This redundancy could have been selected for as an important survival factor for cells with a still primitive, not fail-safe division mechanism.” As we shall see later, functional redundancy, and an apparent ceiling thereof, is documented as an aspect of the relationship between diversity and productivity.
Schematic representation of hypothetical emergence and legacy of the LUCA(33)

Promiscuous and multiphenotypic, dynamic and unstable, LUCA existing as a continual process of unregulated (or poorly regulated) incorporation and/or rejection of innovations via lateral exchanges of genomic and/or catalytic components, presumably via a merging process similar to phagocytosis, between cells devoid of rigid envelopes, living as a community in a broad range of temperatures and chemical environments. The community concept allows for the explanation of major transitional events in evolution, via genetic exchanges within an ancestral and promiscuous community, generating a large variety of forms from which new classes of entities may independently emerge at a new level of complexity. “The emergence of the first Domain must have been the outcome of a crisis rather than a progressive development.”

“Above a certain level of diversification and catalytic interconnections, the [prebiotic] system would undergo ‘catalytic closure’, thereby becoming capable of self-replication.” Catalytic closure refers to a situation in which all catalysts (enzymes) required for metabolisis are synthesized within a cellular system. However, catalytic closure does not necessitate all the catalysts to be enclosed within an individual cell membrane, as evidenced by the many and varied examples of obligate symbiosis, including for example our own human state of obligate syntrophy, facilitated by the microbiome of our digestive tract.

The picture painted here, is one of LUCA and the progenotes, as metabolically and morphologically overlapping heterogeneous communities, continually shuffling around genetic material, which may have been composed of RNA, or DNA, or even a combination of the two. A great but not completely localized conglomeration of biologically diverse actors, collectively producing a common good. Taking a broad view, it may not be terribly unrealistic to assume that the modern planetary biome, driven by a vast variety of symbioses, still exists in this more-or-less promiscuous and evolvable state of nature.

Collective divisions of labour: biological multi-dimensionalism
Clonal populations of wild type Bacillus subtilis can diversify to express at least five (documented) distinct cell types, each associated with a specialized function.

1) Motile cells express flagella, which propel cells in low viscosity environments.
Schematic diagram of flagellar structure.

2) Surfactin-producing cells secrete an amphiphilic surfactant compound that acts to reduce the surface tension of water, as well as functioning as a communication signal, and as an antimicrobial agent (anti-bacterial, anti-viral, anti-fungal, anti-mycoplasmal, and hemolytic). The various services rendered by Surfactin are embedded within the communal micro-habitat, thus bettering the living conditions for all cells comprising the local cellular collective, for this reason Surfactin is considered to be a public good.
Structural formula of a surfactant.

3) Matrix-producing cells secrete extracellular polymeric substances (EPS), the structural protein TasA, and a variety of antimicrobial compounds. EPS acts in a similar manner to the extracellular matrix in higher animals; a biotic medium surrounding and binding cells, facilitating temporary storage and transfer of information and resources between cells, and generally functioning to buffer the cellular collective from environmental stressors. As a component of the EPS, TasA assembles into amyloid-like fibers that attach to cell walls and play a critical role in the formation of various colony morphologies, and in some modes of colonial expansion. The EPS, including the various functional compounds and morphologies embedded within it, is considered to be a public good.
Scanning electron micrograph of biofilm produced by collective secretion of EPS by B. subtilis.

4) Protease-producing cells secrete enzymes that facilitate nutrient acquisition. Secreted proteases are considered public goods.
Schematic diagram of protease function

5) Sporulating cells produce stress-resistant bodies (spores) that can survive extended periods of adverse environmental condition.
Electron micrograph showing an endospore held within a cell body.

Here then is a tentative list of possible states – the phase space of evolutionarily stable strategies of B. subtilis. Importantly, relative proportions of the various specializations observed in any individual colony develop as a result of the environmental condition(s) experienced by the cell collective, and are geared to propagate and increase the common good. Specifically, Gestel et al (2015), have shown that migration of B. subtilis over a solid surface is dependent upon cellular differentiation of cells in a clonal colony, into two distinct phenotypes; surfactin-producing cells and matrix-producing cells. Collectives of these cell types form highly organized structures that the authors have named ‘van Gogh bundles’; tightly aligned, elastic filamentous loops; chains of cells that push themselves away from the edge of the colony. The geometries of van Gogh bundles are mediated via mechanical cellular interactions, with small-scale local changes (cell elongation, division, orientation, and polar interactions) at the level of individual cells determining the collective properties of expanding filamentous loops, emergent at the colony level.(33)

Two distinct cellular phenotypes arising from differentiation of a clonal population of wild type B. subtilis. Surfactin-producing cells (red), matrix-producing cells (green).(34)

Though migration surely is a good strategy for cells living in a limiting environment, we cannot rightly assume that individual bacterial cells are aware of colony-level (organismal) behaviors. In the specific example studied by Gestel et al cells live on a solid surface making individual ‘selfish’ action (flagellar motility) impossible. Apparently the only manner in which individual cells can migrate away from such an environment is via diversified and cooperative, collective action. Though environmental stimuli are important determinants of the differing growth phases of cell collectives, cell differentiation is also inherently stochastic. Gestel et al tell that “under constant environmental conditions, cells can spontaneously differentiate [metabolically switching] into matrix-producing cell chains that are preserved for a number of generations due to a regulatory feedback loop.”

B. subtilis is not the only ‘unicellular’ or ‘single-celled’ species to exhibit a multicellular lifestyle. “Filamentous structures also occur during the colony growth of Paenibacillus vortex and B. mycoides.” Also B. cereus has been shown to switch to a multicellular lifestyle when grown on filter-sterilized soil-extracted soluble organic matter (SESOM) or artificial soil microcosm (ASM) – physical models of environmental conditions that cells encounter in soils. In all four microbial species, multicellularity allows for and facilitates migration via emergent common goods. Interestingly, the domesticated strain B. subtilis 168, which is documented as defective in surfactin production, cannot make the switch to a multicellular lifestyle when grown on SESOM or ASM.

There is an interesting observation to be made here in regard to ESS theory. The mathematical, logical descendent of game theory, is depicted in the literature essentially as a binary system, comprising cooperative and altruistic ‘dove’ actors, versus selfish and aggressive ‘hawk’ actors. In contrast, B. subtilis is presumed to be a quinary system of evolutionary stable strategies, comprising five expressible types of actor, as well as the higher-level collective actor(s) that emerge from synergy between groups of cellular actors – “the formation of van Gogh bundles depends critically on the synergistic interaction of surfactin-producing and matrix-producing cells.”

“Some problems can be solved only when individuals act together. This applies to bacteria in the same way that it applies to humans.”
– Gestel et al, 2015
Stigmergic ants cooperate to move a large food article to the nest. Individuals lifting the load cannot ‘see’ where the nest is; a ‘driver’ (bottom of image) nudges the ‘lifters’ in the direction of the nest.

The diversity-productivity relationship
Difficulties in finding or creating metrics of the common good are widespread. Bouter (2010), has professed that “knowledge is a common good”, pointing out that “finding good indicators of scientific quality is no easy task”. Recognizing that “research is becoming less and less the exclusive province of the universities”, Bouter calls for “co-operation in a variety of changing contexts”. In specific regard to evaluation of the societal relevance of scientific research, he has suggested there is “plenty of room for discussion about the validity of the indicators, the optimum level of detail and weighing up the relative importance of its various aspects. […] However, it is clearly too early to adopt a strong quantitative approach.”(34) In fact, there is no standard metric of the common good.

Standardized quantification of diversification and specialization processes, and of diversified or specialized states, has also proven largely intractable, with various researchers using, or creating, differing working definitions and tools. Nevertheless, studies of diversity have been endowed with a probabilistic metric called the diversity index. This theoretical object has been interpreted in a variety of ways; relatives of the diversity index have been used by ecologists in studies of the relationship between plant diversity and ecosystem function, generally showing that “productivity increases with diversity”(35). From these studies has emerged a statistical model of “a fundamentally important ecological pattern”(36) called the diversity-productivity relationship (DPR).

Zhang et al (2012), tell that the DPR “has received considerable attention during the past two decades”, and that numerous grassland experiments have demonstrated positive DPRs; that is, production of biomass increases with increased biodiversity.(37) A positive DPR coexists with increases of resource use, nutrient retention and cycling, niche differentiation and inter-species facilitation. Generally, the greater the diversity of organisms in an ecosystem, the better each organism (or group) is able to survive and reproduce, due to increases of nutrient abundance, resource availability, habitat partitioning and mutualistic symbioses. Critically, the DPR body of knowledge includes insignificant, and negative, as well as positive effects of biodiversity on productivity. These should be expected however, as results of physical (environmental) limitation, and differences of assumption and quantification in individual studies.

DPR studies tend not to show direct links between ecological mechanisms and positive DPRs. This failure, or inability, results partially from the form of scientific inquiry; a necessarily narrow field of view, focused upon one, or a very few, specific aspect(s) of the object or process being studied. In a meta-analysis of global forest productivity, Zhang et al, have commented that the majority of “DPR studies have chosen species richness as the measure of species diversity to define and interpret DPRs. However, richness alone cannot fully represent species diversity in relation to ecosystem functioning because it ignores the influence of species evenness (relative abundance) on [interspecies] interactions. The lack of understanding of species evenness in DPRs is presumably limited by traditional experimental and statistical methods.”

Zhang et al, chose three dimensions of productivity in their DPR meta-analysis.
1) Biomass: Kg of cellulose, though in reality a great deal more and varied biological material is present.
2) Volume: m3 of forest canopy,
3) Basal area: m2 of forest floor.

The former two (biomass and volume) vary with biological activity, the latter is invariant; all three represent limited common goods. It is important to realize that none of these dimensions, neither individually nor collectively, account for actual forest ecosystem productivity, because a great deal of biological activity crucial to aboveground production of biomass and volume occurs below the forest floor, in the shallow layer of topsoils ignored by the global meta-analysis. Similarly, other obvious environmental factors, such as solar radiation and meteorological water, have been excluded, presumably along with a vast array of less obvious or unknown factors. Even so, Zhang et al have concluded, in agreement with the majority of DPR studies, that positive DPRs are a global phenomenon in forest ecosystems, commenting that “polycultures are generally more productive than mono-cultures”, and that evenness of the canopy volume, as well as contrasting traits between various organisms, are central components of positive diversity-productivity relationships. Furthermore, they report the existence of a diversity plateau at the high end of the species richness range, resulting from functional redundancies among species cohabiting an ecosystem. Thus, ecosystemic synergy is driven toward a diversity-productivity ‘ceiling’, imposed by functional redundancy, which we may well define as homeostasis of the common good.

This last point exposes what I believe to be a fundamental sociophysical phenomenon of critical importance to the understanding of common goods and of sustainable development; natural limits are imposed upon all complex systems. Interestingly, if shade is viewed as a phenomenon emerging from the metabolic activities of plant growth, and that shade produced by these conditions drives speciation, then we may rightly consider shade to be a limited common good.

Trogisch (2012), has focused upon processes occurring below the forest floor, specifically the states of nitrogen and leaf litter decomposition in soil samples from a subtropical forest. He has suggested that primary productivity and nutrient cycling be considered common goods, and has confirmed a consensus regarding the reduced vulnerability of diversified ecosystems to environmental stress. Furthermore, he has proposed functional redundancy among diverse species as a systemic stabilizer, allowing ecosystem functions and services to remain unchanged, or less affected, after environmental perturbation.(38)

“Forests account for 80% of the world’s plant biomass and are therefore a main driver and component of the Earth’s biogeochemical cycles. Their versatile services such as climate regulation and protection of soil resources, denotes them as one of the most important terrestrial ecosystems for human wellbeing.” Indeed one may justly argue that forest ecosystems are common goods that propagate wellbeing for a vast, uncounted, number of species.

A most remarkable passage in Trogisch’s thesis teaches that “decomposition dynamics in mixed leaf litter often show non-additive effects so that [nitrogen] is released at a faster rate than predicted from decomposition rates of corresponding single-species leaf litter. Such litter diversity effects during decomposition can lead to a feedback reaction positively influencing plant productivity”. Thus, species diversity affects irrational, non-computable, synergistic processes, that act to increase and stabilize the common good.

Jacobs knowledge spillover: relating the DPR with the common good in an economic context
Jane Jacobs questioned why some cities grow and others decay. Her theory of agricultural origin, published in 1969, proposed that agricultural knowledge and practical technologies emerged from a diversified human collective. Jacobs concluded that “high and sustained levels of innovative behavior and entrepreneurship inevitably result in the increased diversification and complexity of the local economic base over time and that a diversified urban economy provides the best setting for entrepreneurial and innovative behavior”. Thus, increases in the number and diversity of divisions of labor endow an economy with an increased capacity for production of goods and services.(40)

Reviewing Jacobs, Desrochers & Hospers (2007) list four characteristics of economic systems(39) that are also common to biological systems:
1) Development is dependent upon the self-organization of numerous and various complex relationships, from which differentiations emerge, giving rise to an organ from which further differentiations emerge.

2) Expansion (growth) is dependent upon the capture and use of energy. The greater the diversity of means for capturing, using, recapturing, and reusing energy before its discharge from the system, the more resilient the system is.

3) Self-maintenance (constitutive self-regulation) is an intrinsic systemic process, incorporating positive and negative feedback, along with aspects of development and growth.

4) Evasion of systemic collapse incorporates self-maintenance, bifurcation, positive and negative feedback, and emergency adaptations, together helping to ensure systemic longevity. However, entropic effects are certain to impact upon any system, as a gradual increase of disorder (disorganization) in internal (systemic) and external (environmental) structures.

The similarities between ecology and economy in regard to the relationship between diversity and productivity are striking. Critically however, the economic literature ignores, or fails to identify, the presence of natural limits to productivity imposed by a diversity plateau; a functional redundancy among local actors. Building upon Desrochers & Hospers (2007), I propose that the emphasis of economics in modern culture has switched from natural diversity and complexity to artificial specialty and simplicity; from a natural stable-state driven by dynamism, to an unnatural unstable-state propagated by statism; from divergent inefficient creativity, to convergent efficient monotony.

As seems to be the case with all researches attempting to relate diversity and productivity, Desrochers & Leppala have admitted that quantification of frequency and relative importance of Jacobs spillovers (diversity index of knowledge sharing) could not be measured satisfactorily, commenting that “simply because something is immeasurable does not mean that it is necessarily unobservable, unintelligible or unimportant.”(40)

The synergistic function of complex systems identified here as the Jacobs spillover and the DPR is reminiscent of the messy workspace phenomenon – in which the current project(s), may ‘shake hands’ with past works and even future hopefuls, allowing for greater capacities of creative problem solving, insight, adaptation and innovation. Vohs et al (2013), have reported that “disorderly environments […] can produce highly desirable outcomes, […] encourage novelty-seeking and unconventional routes, [thus stimulating] creativity, which has widespread importance for culture, business, and the arts.”(41) Strangely, and rather irrationally, Vohs et al have omitted the sciences in their list of beneficiaries, thus apparently denying scientific pursuits the privilege of “disorderly environments”.

In 1945, the economist and Nobel laureate Friedrich Hayek suggested that “any approach, such as that of mathematical economics with its simultaneous equations, which in effect starts from the assumption that people’s knowledge corresponds with the objective facts of the situation, systematically leaves out what is our main task to explain.” He believed that “objective or scientific knowledge is not the sum of all knowledge”, that there are other unorganized kinds of knowledge. Critical of economic theory, Hayek proposed that, in reality, no one has perfect information, only the capacity and skill to find information.(42) Thus the reality of economics is not, as commonly held by economists, a pure logic of choice, but rather “knowledge relevant to actions and plans”.(40)

“Unfortunately for mathematical economists, this kind of knowledge [relevant to actions and plans] cannot enter into statistics: it is mostly subjective”.(40)
– Friedrich Hayek, 1945

“There is something deadening to the human mind in uniformity; progress comes through variation.”(40)
– Malcom Keir, 1919

Desrochers & Leppala (2011) describe an essential aspect of creativity (divergent thinking) as “the capacity to look beyond the normal application context of artifacts and ideas”. Creative, inventive and innovative progress, leading to increases in diversity, knowledge and productivity, is facilitated by opportunities for specialists to explore areas in which they are not experts, and to work on several different projects simultaneously, by means of a variety of familiar and unfamiliar methods. This pair of practical concepts is the path to polymathy. Unsurprising then, that polymaths are viewed by history as individuals who have produced the greatest common good – in the sense that they have given, most often at no cost, greatly useful intellectual gifts to humankind.

Common uncertainty: the diversity index
In a meta-analysis of global economic development, aimed at drawing generic conclusions for all countries with available data, Kaulich (2012), echoes the concerns of Farhauer & Kröl (2012), Bouter (2010), Zhang et al (2012), and Desrochers & Leppala (2011), reporting that “different and sometimes conflicting definitions and measurements of diversification/specialization have been used, together with different datasets”.

The economies of all countries are based upon agriculture, with the successful export of agricultural goods allowing for diversification away from primary production, via the manufacture of initially simple products, leading to increasingly sophisticated activities. Diversification, claims Kaulich, is intrinsic to, and is the driving force of economic development.

Kaulich has also found a positive relationship, specifically between the diversity of products exported by an economy and its per capita level of income.(46) At “quite a high level of income per capita” (~ $22,000 / year) economic diversification of the average country slows down, lead by the manufacturing sector toward a plateau. Thus, as a country transitions from a developing to a developed economy, it simultaneously encounters a diversity ‘ceiling’, which limits its economic growth. This pattern is very similar to the ecological DPR, in which productivity is driven toward a diversity ‘plateau’ imposed by functional redundancies among species cohabiting an ecosystem. Is it fair, then, to speak of an economic diversity-income relationship, and of economic homeostasis?

“A country’s economic growth may be defined as a long-term rise in capacity to supply increasingly diverse economic goods to its population.”(43)
– Kuznets, 1971

“Whatever it is that serves as the driving force of economic development, it cannot be the forces of comparative advantage as conventionally understood. The trick seems to be to acquire mastery over a broader range of activities, instead of concentrating on what one does best.”(44)
– Rodrik (2004)

“The common notion to specialize in “what one does best” as a means to achieve economic prosperity and hence poverty reduction seems to be fundamentally wrong.”(45)
– Kaulich, 2012

Kaulich cites an earlier report, UNIDO (2009), suggesting that re-specialization may occur at the high-income end of economic development. This affords a diplomatic position within the diversity vs. specialization debate, which Kaulich makes masterful use of, posing that economic theories arguing exclusively for or against economic specialization appear contradictory, but may both be correct, albeit identifiable at differing points in the economic development of a country. However, his own analysis of global trade data does not conclusively show a U-curve, suggestive of a decrease in economic diversification at the high-income end in combination with continued increase of income. Instead, Kaulich has confidently reported an L-curve.
Sketch graph showing economic diversification increasing with product sophistication and income per capita, leading to a diversity-income plateau.
– adapted from UNIDO (2012)

In stating that “successful policies for economic diversification cannot consist of a top-down process with a static set of rules for the private sector”, the UNIDO working paper clearly advocates a policy admissive of complexity; reliant upon self-regulation, and based upon bottom-up self-organization of diverse actors.

The use of various diversity indices in empirical studies of ecologies and of economies, has produced a pattern among observations. A generally positive relationship is identified between quantitative measures of diversity and productivity, leading to a plateau at the high diversity end of abundance and evenness.

One must ask: is the observed limit a physical, entropic, phenomenon, or an artifact of the diversity index? Irrationally, I prefer the former, and suggest that various independent empirical studies have collectively identified an apparent homeostatic epiphenomenon of sociophysical dynamism; steady-state animism on a macro scale, perhaps even a planetary scale. A common-good-state-of-nature.

It should be appreciated that the terms ‘synergy’, ‘epiphenomenon’ and ‘sociophysics’ sit rather uncomfortably within the envelope of science, because their meanings act as signposts toward an understanding of metaphysics. Perhaps Rosen intuited correctly that relational studies of living systems may produce new knowledge of physics and result in profound changes for science?

Scientific understandings of economics and politics appear to be fundamentally incorrect. We must revise our worldview in order to permit the inclusion of non-computable phenomena the emerge from interactions between diverse actors to produce common goods.

F) Hypothesis:
i) Universally, the collective efficiency of a diverse set of actors is greater than that of a specialized set of actors.
η(ΣAd > ΣAs) → U

ii) Locally, the collective efficiency of a specialized set of actors is greater than that of a diverse set of actors.
η(ΣAs > ΣAd) → L

Where U is universal (i.e. global) effect, L is local effect, η is efficiency, Σ is sum (collective), Ad is diverse actor, As is specialized actor.

Hypothetical predictions:
A diverse set of actors is a necessary prerequisite for the emergence of specialized actors.
A diverse set of actors is a necessary prerequisite for the emergence of common goods.

G) Progenotes are defined as organic elements comprising the communal ancestor, identified in the lineages now assumed as the phylogenetic ‘tree of life’.

28) O. Farhauer & A. Kröl, “Diversified Specialisation – Going One Step Beyond Regional Economics” Specialisation-Diversification Concept”, (2012), JAHRBUCH FÜR REGIONALWISSENSCHAFT, Vol.32, Number 1, p.63-84,

29) “The collapse of manufacturing”, (February, 2009), The Economist,

30) J. Whitfield, “Origins of life: Born in a watery commune”, (2004), Nature Vol. 427, p. 674-676, abstract:

31) C. Woese, “The Universal Ancestor”, (1998), Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the USA, 95(12): 6854–6859,

32) N. Glansdorff, Y. Xu & B. Labendan, “The Last Universal Common Ancestor: emergence, constitution and genetic legacy of an elusive forerunner”, (2008), Biology Direct,

33) J. Gestel, H. Vlamakis, R. Kolter, “From Cell Differentiation to Cell Collectives: Bacillus subtilis Uses Division of Labor to Migrate”, (2015), PLOS Biology,

34) L. Bouter, “Knowledge as a common good: the societal relevance of scientific research”, (2010), Higher Education Management and Policy, Vol. 22/1,

35) J. van Ruijven and F. Berendse, “Diversity-productivity relationships: Initial effects, long-term patterns, and underlying mechanisms”, (2004), Vol. 102.3, PNAS, abstract

36) H. Hillebrand and B. Cardinale, “A critique for meta-analyses and the productivity-diversity relationship”, (2010), Ecology, Vol. 91.9, p. 2545-2549,

37) Y. Zhang, H. Chen, P.Reich, “Forest productivity increases with evenness, species richness and trait variation: a global meta-analysis”, (2012), Journal of Ecology, Vol.100, p.742–749,

38) S. Trogisch, “The functional significance of tree diversity for soil N-pools, leaf litter decomposition and N-uptake complementarity in subtropical forests in China”, (2012), ETH ZURICH,

39) P. Desrochers & S. Leppala, “Opening up the ‘Jacobs Spillovers’ black box: local diversity, creativity and the processes underlying new combinations”, (2011), Journal of Economic Geography, Vol 11, p. 843–863, abstract only

40) P. Desrochers and G-J. Hospers, “Cities and the Economic Development of Nations: An Essay on Jane Jacobs’ Contribution to Economic Theory”, (2007), Canadian Journal of Regional Science, Vol. 3(1), p. 115-130,

41) K. Vohs et al, “Physical Order Produces Healthy Choices, Generosity, and Conventionality, Whereas Disorder Produces Creativity”, (2013), Psychological Science Vol 24(9), p. 1860–1867, abstract

42) B. Godin, “The Knowledge Economy: Fritz Machlup’s Construction of a Synthetic Concept”, (2008),

43) S. Kuznets, “Modern Economic Growth: Findings and Reflections. Prize Lecture”, (1971), Lecture to the memory of Alfred Nobel,

44) D. Rodrik, “Industrial Policy for the Twenty-First Century”, (2004), Harvard University,

45) F. Kaulich, “Diversification vs. specialization as alternative strategies for economic development: Can we settle a debate by looking at the empirical evidence?”, (2012), Development Policy, Statistics and Research Branch, UNIDO,

The Common Good: a semi-rational emergent property of complex collective interaction between diverse actors – Part I

The common good invariably requires diversification, manifest as random fluctuations within the biological phase space from which emerge divisions of labour, and thus necessarily, inequalities among individuals comprising a social collective. Entropic forcing drives increases of the common good, via increased diversity, to an apparent limit.

Explorations are made of philosophical (Part I) and empirical (Part II) studies in politics, biology, and economics.

Cooperation via collective divisions of labour is a necessary prerequisite to biological metabolism and reproduction. A collective comprising diverse actors is thus assumed fundamental to the planetary biome. The preponderance of benefit (here designated ‘the common good’) that emerges for actors (individuals and groups), is mediated by Woesean collective cooperation, defined as “a diverse community of cells(note A) surviving and evolving as a biological unit.”(1)

“Diversity is an asset with which to confront uncertainty.”
– Groschl, 2013

Part I: Philosophical observations, models and theoretical analyses

Politikos: definition and mediation of the common good
Commenting on Aristotle’s political theory, F. Miller (2011) tells that “the modern word ‘political’ derives from the [Ancient Greek πολιτικός] ‎politikós, ‘of, or pertaining to the polis’ [polis translates as ‘city-state’, or city]. City-states like Athens and Sparta were relatively small and cohesive units, in which political, religious, and cultural concerns were intertwined. The extent of their similarity to modern nation-states is controversial.”(2)

As a point of interest, Amish culture, described in a previous post titled The Worldly and The Amish represents a modern, relatively small and cohesive population unit, in which political, religious, and cultural concerns are intertwined. Presumably, the world’s remaining populations of ‘primitive’ peoples (nations) would also fit this description, so Miller’s controversy appears to exist principally between modern globalized (‘worldly’) culture, and what one might loosely term ‘old school cultures’, or perhaps the ‘old world order’.

Edward Jenks’ well informed comment, describing a founding and central aspect of political states, seems much less controversial: “[Evidently,] all political communities of the modern type owe their existence to successful warfare. As a natural consequence, they are forced to be organized on military principles […].”(3)

Referring to warring as “sad”, Jenks (1909), posed that plunder is easier, or at least quicker, than working to build up and equip a household, and that men would be unwilling to give up a household; property. The resulting conflict, more than feudalism, developed the practical knowledge of plunder – how best to get stuff with a minimal input of work, and how best to protect the stuff you have worked to accumulate. War, then, is a result of ownership and property.

Jacques Callot, “Plundering a Large Farmhouse”, (1633), plate 5, The Miseries of War.
Inscribed: Here are the fine exploits of these inhuman hearts. They ravage everywhere. Nothing escapes their hands. One invents tortures to gain gold, another encourages his accomplices to perform a thousand heinous crimes, and all with one accord viciously commit theft, kidnapping, murder and rape.

Warfare and military organization were surely intrinsic to city-states existing during Aristotle’s lifetime, which he described as comprising a collection of parts (natural resources, households, and individual citizens), together taking a compound form, and certain order, defining the constitution of the state. For Aristotle, state constitution was not just a theoretical, ‘on paper’, statement of cultural ideals, but an immanent organizing principle analogous to the soul (spirit or genius) of an organism. Thus the Aristotelian constitution of the polis is the way of life of the citizens.(2)

In accordance with Aristotle’s political naturalism, political episteme (from Ancient Greek ἐπιστήμη, epistḗmē, ‘knowledge’) incorporates various practical sciences, such as the art of war (military), the art of household management (economy: from Ancient Greek οἰκονομία, oikonomia, ‘management of a household’, ‘administration’), and the art of language (rhetoric: from Ancient Greek ῥητορικός, ‎rhētorikós, ‘concerning public speech’). Critically, all practical sciences are means of rendering a collective human good. “Even if the end is the same for an individual and for a city-state, that of the city-state seems at any rate greater and more complete to attain and preserve. For although it is worthy to attain it for only an individual, it is nobler and more divine to do so for a nation or city-state”.(2)

“The needs of the many outweigh the needs of the few – or the one.”
– Spock & Kirk, Startrek II: The Wrath of Khan, 1982

Aristotelian political episteme refers to knowledge of how, why, when and where among the citizenry, noble acts and happiness occur, leading to an understanding of how, where and when to act; implementing policy in order to promote general goodness (a common good quality of life) for the state.

Modern political science does not inspire a great deal of noble action or happiness in citizens, if it did then commoners would surely all hold more respect for careering politicians – a role of state that each of us plays, either by direct action or indirectly by deference of action. The fact that so many modern citizens tend to believe that deference of their individual governing responsibility, to an unknown group of ‘representatives’ is better for them as individuals as well as for the commons, than collective self-governance is, clearly shows a lack of political episteme, and hence faith in political science – a faith in systematized governance, definable as technocracy.

A culture of faith in technocracy renders an equivalence between the church (spiritual affairs) and the state (affairs of governance), which is inescapable even if – or perhaps particularly if – one assumes oneself to be a divine ruler. This common faith of modernity invalidates the controversy suggested by Miller (2011), regarding the extent to which ancient city-states and modern states are (dis)similar; political, spiritual and cultural affairs are as intertwined in modernity as they were in antiquity.

Groschl (2013) propagates the Aristotelian meaning of political episteme, as concerning collective life for its own sake, and he suggests that modern political science acts to prevent people from accessing an understanding of what politics means.(4)

Here then is a guide:
Political life renders a constitution; the socio-physical epifunction of a population that emerges from a cultural milieu, is not attributable to any individual or group, but comprises a collection of individual and/or group interactions within and between a population and its local environment.

Political episteme is a collection of arts; the practical and theoretical knowledge of noble action and happiness of citizens, the purpose of which is to ensure a good constitution; a common good quality of life for a population.

Political science is the practical and theoretical knowledge of distribution and management of power and resources.

Better worded definitions do not detract from the difference in meaning between the latter two. Epistemes are outrospective, mostly open and giving. Sciences are introspective, mostly closed and reductive.

Political science – indeed science of any kind – is attributable solely to humans, and in particular to modern, ‘western’ (now ‘global’) affluent culture. Groschl teaches that political science has been tuned to Hobbesian political philosophy, leading into an era of misconception, or possibly preconception, about the meaning of economy – which is now assumed to be an intrinsic, if not central, aspect of politics. In modernity, both politics and economy have been redirected to face inward, targeting individual private interests as their primary beneficiaries. So it is due to the moral of modern society (modern worldview) that the rights and ambitions of the individual are elevated to a near holy status. We assume genius as ‘proprietary’ of an individual, rather than being the result of the commons; emerging gracefully from the cultural milieu – the complex and uncertain interactions of many and varied actors. Interestingly though, products of genius (generally forms of knowledge) are appropriated by society as common goods.

In emphasis of this last point it seems prudent to assume, as do Bibard & Groschl (2013), that goods and goodness are defined almost ubiquitously among our past and present cultures, as shared phenomena. As an example, they pose little good in owning the most beautiful painting in the world if no one but the painter ever experiences it. Indeed, without sharing experiences of the painting, how can the painter know that it is the most beautiful painting in the world? Goods are necessarily shared, and are thus to a greater or lesser extent, common.

Modernity holds the misinformed consensus that common goods, indeed goods of any kind, are necessarily made; that goods do not exist without the expenditure of energy by some individual or group. This interpretation has most likely resulted from our cultural fixation upon business, in which goods are produced, traded, bought, sold, and finally consumed. Critically, solar radiation and water seem obvious candidate common goods, yet neither can reasonably be assumed to be a product of expenditure of energy by some individual or group. Also critically, goods are not necessarily good; it is possible to trade bad goods, or a bad lot of otherwise good goods. The word good appears to have a vaguer meaning stemming from the Germanic word gōd.

Orthodox biologists claim that common goods (termed ‘public goods’ in the technical dialect of biology) are invariably products of metabolic activity, and thus require work to produce. The word public is derived from the Latin publicus, which is a blend of poplicus ‘of the people’ (from populus ‘people’) and pubes ‘adult’. In contrast the word common is derived from the Latin communis, which is itself derived from the old Latin comoenus ‎’shared’, ‘general’. Thus the misunderstanding of common good, held by biologists, appears to be due to uncritical confusion of the meanings of the words ‘public’ and ‘common’, and in particular to a propagated misuse of the word ‘public’(note B).

However, this view is not ubiquitous among scientists. In private correspondence, an ecologist and forest ecosystem conservationist from the University of Wageningen in the Netherlands, G. Havik, has suggested that we should “distinguish common goods from limited common goods”, as the latter poses important consequences for evolution. “Sunlight” he has said “will not be a limited common good for as long as we are around on this planet – except when you’re in someone’s shade, which has driven speciation”. From Havik’s perspective, sunlight is an unlimited common good that is shared and used, but not produced, by metabolic activities. As we shall learn later during exploration of the diversity productivity relationship (DPR), increased diversity of life systems (speciation) may itself be considered a common good. Thus, in an ecological context, shade is an emergent property of biological metabolism, rendering a limiting condition upon the use of an unlimited common good, and shade is also itself a limited common good, due to its diversification effect upon organisms.

A similar example may be made of water. Orthodoxy says that water can be a common (or public) good only if energy is expended in order to create a good, such as a distribution and/or filtration facility rendering potable water. However, we shall assume a wider, more inclusive and more natural interpretation:
Water is a common good if it is available for use.(note C)

Wealth-getting: profiteering vs. sustaining
Non in depravatis, sed in his quae bene secundum naturam se habent, considerandum est quid sit naturale.
What is natural has to be investigated not in beings that are depraved, but in those that are according to nature.
– Aristole, Politics, Book 1(5)

Business assumes to share the goodness (profit) produced by its activities with a select group of actors (the shareholders), but not with a wider ecological sphere (the stakeholders). Simply, business is conducted for the good of an individual legal person; a corporation. In accordance with political science, the purpose of human social interaction – our political lives – is to serve private interests as exclusively as possible. Another way of saying this is that modern human social interaction is geared toward rendering and increasing private goods.

From my own perspective at the time of writing this essay, a cultural moral of self-fulfillment rather than social responsibility, seems to have peaked in the 1970’s among the post WWII American baby boomer culture; the “Me generation”. Twenge & Campbell (2009) have identified and exposed a generational aftershock; a “destructive spread of narcissism”.(6)

Bibard & Groschl suggest that private profiteering, exemplified by the corporate sector under the umbrella of political science, stands in full contradiction to a possible common good. They tell that ancient political philosophy respected private interests to some degree, and thus allowed business to occur to some extent, as a result of political life. Profiteering however, was viewed as a manner of managing private, familial, household affairs. The commons (community, city-state or nation) while requiring wealth-getting activities, does not necessitate a profit-motivated attitude. Aristotle further dissected wealth-getting, by defining a necessary branch that is related to sustenance, is limited, and by nature a part of household management; and an unnecessary branch that is unlimited, unnatural (abstract) and addictive.

“[Some] people suppose that it is the function of economy (household management) to increase property, and they are continually under the idea that it is their duty to be either safeguarding their substance in money or increasing it to an unlimited amount. The cause of this state of mind is that their interests are set upon life but not upon the good life. [Even] those who fix their aim on the good life seek the good life as measured by bodily enjoyments, so that inasmuch as this also seems to be found in the possession of property, all their energies are occupied in the business of getting wealth; and owing to this the second kind of the art of wealth-getting has arisen. For as their enjoyment is in excess, they try to discover the art that is productive of enjoyable excess; and if they cannot procure it by the art of wealth-getting, they try to do so by some other means, employing each of the faculties in an unnatural way.”(7)
Lead characters in the film The Wolf of Wall Street (2013).

“[The] business of drawing provision from the fruits of the soil and from animals is natural to all. But, […] this art is twofold, one branch being of the nature of trade while the other belongs to the household art; and the latter branch is necessary and in good esteem, but the branch connected with exchange is justly discredited (for it is not in accordance with nature, but involves men’s taking things from one another). As this is so, usury is most reasonably hated, because its gain comes from money itself and not from that for the sake of which money was invented. For money was brought into existence for the purpose of exchange, but interest increases the amount of the money itself; consequently this form of the business of getting wealth is of all forms the most contrary to nature.”(7)
– Aristotle ca. 350 BC

Earning money or any manner of profiteering for its own sake, tends to lead people astray from the good life. Aristotelian political philosophy does not assume the Hobbesian primacy of private freedoms, but is oriented toward a common good life via collective functions of community. Likewise, Bibard & Groschl suggest that the ultimate ends of our actions, in business as in political life, should be directed outward, toward the good of the commons, and that the common good should be understood as fulfilling human ends; producing a good quality of life.

Politics should be geared for and directed toward human ends, simple biological needs, not toward vanity or enrichment for their own sake. This message is echoed by the words and meanings of wizards and sages, stretching from ancient times through to modernity. They teach that the path toward intellectual fulfillment via a good quality education, leading to holistic contemplation, is a far healthier human pursuit than is simple material, or worse still, monetary acquisition.

Clearly, ancient philosophies of political episteme and of household management are more relevant to human nature than are their modern theoretic counterparts, political science and economics, respectively. Apparently, people hang onto the modern habit unreasonably; faithfully doing damage.

Spontaneous politic
Aristotle viewed humans as spontaneously political animals, and indeed human nature is fundamentally social. However, social behaviors of some kind or other may be observed throughout the known biome. Organisms are necessarily embedded within life-systems, thus living as parts of collectives (communities, ecosystems) that are formed and maintained via continual biosemiosis.
Consciously or not, we continually measure and compare ourselves and our acts against those of our peers – be they members of our own, or another species.

Schematic diagram showing potential bacterial interspecies interactions.(8)

The natural state currently proposed, is a spontaneously occurring, complex, anarchic, self-organizing and self-regulating, adaptive milieu fundamental to life-systems. The ‘state of nature’ is thus understood as an emergent sociophysical epifunction.

Homo sapiens is nestled symbiotically within the wholeness of the planetary biota. A similar natural state may be assumed to exist for all organisms and life systems on Earth, from the lowly kitchen sponge microbe(9)(10), through the great ocean mammal(11), to the mighty forest dendron(12).

Let us venture the supposition that no organism is capable of sustaining life in the absence of interactions with other organisms. Orthodox biologists would disagree with this umbrella definition, arguing that individual unicellular organisms (such as bacterial or archeal cells, some protozoa and algae) are capable of surviving in isolation, as chemotrophic or photosynthetic primary producers. Here, then, stands a challenge to provide an unambiguous example as proof of biotic independence in situ – naturally. In vitro attempts at sustaining an individual cell, isolated from sources of organic nutrients as well as from mineral products of biotic processes, fail rapidly. If access to organic nutrients and biotic mineral cycling is made available to the cell, then metabolism can continue, invariably leading to colonization of the habitat, by invasion of other species and/or clonal (vegetative) reproduction giving rise to genetic mutants. In either case the result is a form of diversified symbiotic collective; a culture.

The interaction imperative is expressed clearly by Cowden (2012), “the organism with the best interaction strategy has the highest fitness [and] stable payoff equilibriums have been shown for cooperation and altruism, behaviors that seem contradictory to the strongly supported individualistic, survival of the fittest mode of evolution”.(13)

Models of social behavior: informatory and unreal
Computer models of social behavior, are fundamentally flawed due to their necessarily rational (computational) basis. Natural systems of social behavior are in part, necessarily logical, but are just as necessarily irrational (non-computable) due to the fundamentally uncertain nature of nature itself. In order to be understandable, a model can only ever approximate nature in a simplistic manner, and in accordance with the state of knowledge (theory) at the time of the model’s construction. The sciences are model based activities, in theory. In practice, the sciences necessarily incorporate, then so far as technically possible, deny the influences of irrational factors.

Models, whether computerized or not, represent a truncation of reality. Scientific knowledge thus also represents a truncation of reality. Fascinating and awesome it is to begin to grasp the scale of modern moral and knowledge lock-in.(14)(15)

Game theory teaches that “cooperation results in the highest mutual benefit”. An offshoot of game theory, evolutionary stable strategy (ESS) theory, assumes that “a uniform environment, and resources are available everywhere”.(13)

ESS theory is an example of modeled social behavior. The theory is originally attributed to John M. Smith, a former aeronautical engineer turned geneticist and theoretical biologist who also developed signaling theory (biosemiotics), and to George Price, a physical chemist turned population geneticist and theoretical biologist, turned devout Christian and altruist. Price eventually committed suicide due to depression, perhaps in part due to an inability to show in practice what was provable in theory.
Clockwise from top left: William D. Hamilton, John M. Smith, George Price, John Nash, John von Neumann.

Smith & Price followed the works of evolutionary biologist and geneticist turned mathematician and logician William D. Hamilton, the polyhistor John von Neumann, and the mathematician, logician and schizophrenic John Nash, the latter both known for their work on game theory. Much like game theory, ESS theory comprises logical manipulation of rational, albeit abstract mathematical characterizations. The subject of ESS theory was popularized by Richard Dawkins in 1976, with his book The Selfish Gene, in which Dawkins made frequent use of the phrase “all other things being equal”, of course in natural environmental circumstances all other things are often not equal. To his credit, Dawkins did make reference to this fact, commenting that the environment does tend to radical and sudden change, thus allowing for the displacement of an existing ESS, which gives way to the emergence of new strategic patterns, before eventual re-stabilization of the biotic system into a new ESS; a new steady state.(16)

In the nascent literature of economics, environmentalism, and political theory, which together form the bulk of serious theoretical work on the topic of sustainable development, the emergence and stabilization of a novel ESS following the breakdown of an existing ESS, is termed a “paradigm shift”, which is nothing less than a change of cultural moral; a change of worldview.

In his popularization of genetic fundamentalism, Dawkins propagated arguments against the existence of altruistic behaviors and group selection, saying that both are common misunderstandings of phenomena that benefit individual genes. Dawkins knowingly skipped over a closely related concept, Hamiltonian inclusive fitness, which must have seemed as likely then as it does now, to disrupt the foundation of the gene-centric orthodox theoretical edifice. In fact, Dawkins’ text mentions inclusive fitness only in a footnote of the (2006) 30th anniversary edition, referring to his colleague and collaborator Alan Grafen, who’s work (Grafen, 1984) reported “the widespread misuse of Hamilton’s concept of ‘inclusive fitness’.” Grafen himself seems to have been considerably broader of mind, admitting that Hamilton’s rule (note D) upon which kin selection theory, inclusive fitness theory, and ESS theory are founded, “holds good only under certain assumptions”. There are “different definitions of [relatedness], and the scope of the rule depends on the definition of [relatedness] employed”. Grafen interpreted inclusive fitness as “a device that simplifies the calculation of conditions for the spread of certain alleles”, and suggested that the expression of those alleles affects the number of offspring produced by other organisms in a population.(17)

This last point brings us to the controversial idea of group selection, which makes intuitive sense (species are born, reproduce and become extinct, just as organisms are born, reproduce and die) but is vague and difficult to rationalize, particularly from the gene-centric perspective. However, empirical evidence of higher level selection (selection of traits above the level of individual organisms) was published by Wade (1976). In his initial study of group fitness among populations of Flour beetles, Wade concluded that a genetic bottlenecking “process of random extinctions with recolonization can establish conditions favorable to the operation of group selection.”(18) In a continuation of his experimental work, Wade (1980), reported that “under many circumstances, a species performance in competition is not predictable from its performance in single-species culture”, and that “competitive ability can be viewed as an indirect but general measure of the nature of population response to group and individual selection for increased and decreased population size.”(19)

Unclear and slight, the group selection idea is perhaps too easily dismissed. We shall not dwell upon it further here, except to point out that it bears the markings of an emergent phenomenon, and to respectfully remind the reader that epigenetic phenomena (the potentially heritable alteration of genetic traits, environmentally affected above the level of DNA code) are a relatively recent discovery.(20)

In regard to altruistic behaviors, Reuter et al (2010), have reported that in humans “oxytocin promotes interpersonal trust by inhibiting defensive behaviours and by linking this inhibition with the activation of dopaminergic reward circuits, enhancing the value of social encounters.”(21) Furthermore, a handful of genetic association studies have linked polymorphisms of the oxytocin receptor gene (OXTR) and the vasopressin 1a receptor gene (AVPR1A) to prosocial behaviors, while concurrently implicating the dopaminergic system. Thompson et al (2013), report two genes as candidate genes for human altruism, OXTR and cluster of differentiation 38 (CD38), both genes are active in the regulation of blood plasma concentrations of oxytocin. They suggest that OXTR and CD38 mediate trade-offs between self-focused cognition and behaviors, versus prosocial cognition and altruistic behaviors.(22)

“Inclusive fitness is often associated with kin selection, as more closely related organisms more likely share the same alleles – such alleles are referred to as ‘identical by descent’ as they are from a common ancestor. However, altruism genes may be found in non-related individuals, thus relatedness is not a strict requirement of inclusive fitness [which is widely quoted as an explanation for the evolution of altruistic behaviors]” Cowden (2012).

I continue to feed and care for an organism similar to the one pictured here. Dawkins would say that my expressions of care toward my pet Uma are not altruistic but selfish, that Uma somehow increases my own reproductive capacity, or at least that I am pushing my own feel good button. That may be so, I openly admit that my quality of life is bettered by Uma’s company, though Uma tends to enjoy a good quality of life also.
We’re not yet sure about the cat, who has been invited into the household to manage a population of mice. Apparently I am incapable of altruism toward mice.

Jest aside, wild biomes (natural states) are not all red in tooth and claw, but they are all complex and diversified, symbiotic and synergistic systems, defined by divisions of labour and collective actions, producing an emergent common good. Inclusive fitness does not describe a Hobbesian war of each against all, but infers the indirect reproduction of identical copies of traits (behaviors or phenotypes linked to environmental or genetic components) parallel to the vertical gene transfer achieved by parents to their offspring; horizontal gene transfer, as documented by microbiologists, comes closer but still does not fully hit the mark of indirect reproduction. Essentially, distant relatives within a species, as well as siblings, even twins, exemplify indirect reproduction. A wider exemplary scope might expose the various and diverse hemoproteins.

Hemoglobin is a tetrameric protein (left), comprising four heme groups (right).

“If iron is nature’s favorite essential metal, then heme is its Swiss Army knife: a versatile, indispensible tool that, in the company of its protein sheath, can do seemingly anything. The power of heme is particularly evident in the prokaryotes, where diversity in the catalytic activities of heme proteins, as well as proteins involved in the uptake, trafficking and sensing of heme, appears to be vast”.(23)
– Mayfield et al, (2011)

Dawkins paved his approach to the subject of biological collectivism, altruism, and social behavior, with logic and computer models. He was confident that he saw clearly, a single formal system, operating invariant rules, written by men – the theoretical evolutionary stable strategy (ESS). In all honesty, I admit to seeing rather less clearly, more vaguely and uncertainly, a set of complex and interacting systems. Biological processes are changeable, adaptable; are not written; are not rules, but malleable agreements and necessary compromises.

Theoretical biologist R. Rosen, argued that a living organism is not a machine, and thus cannot have a computer-simulable model. Furthermore, Rosen opined that the current reductionistic state of science – “sacrificing the whole in order to study the parts” – is inadequate to create a coherent theory of biological systems, as life is not observed after dissection of a biological organization. Rosen held what seems to be a mystical belief – that biology is not a subset of known physics, that relational studies of living systems (how parts of living systems relate to each other) may produce new knowledge of physics and result in profound changes for science generally. Inspired by Gödel’s theorems of incompleteness, and the limitations of Turing-computability, he suggested that “we should widen our concept of what models are”.(24)

The assumption of strict empiricism is fundamentally untenable, as any observation is necessarily dependent upon subjective experience. Thus the ’empirical sciences’, as well as those bodies of knowledge best termed ‘epistemes’ – including politics, psychology and the ‘arts’ – are principally subjective, intuitive understandings, leading to the formation and execution of practical arts, allowing for the acquisition of empirical knowledge. Rationalizations of irrational processes such as politics and the (inter)actions of political states, are conducive to modeling in a manner similar to the modeling of physical phenomena, those models being necessarily based upon truncations of empirical measurement, to render computable data.

That markets are composed of individual rational actors, is a fundamental supposition upon which modern economic theory is built, allowing for precise computational modeling of economic activity. However, this founding assumption is clearly incorrect; markets are composed of people (individuals and groups), and people are not invariably rational actors. Simply, people are not machines, they do not always Turing-compute, or act in accordance with expectation (theoretical or otherwise); people do not always do the right thing. Thus real market behaviors tend not to conform tightly with statistical, theoretical prediction. This observation is communicated succinctly by Bibard & Groschl, who have said that “the economic assumption of pure and perfect rationality is not an empirical, but a theoretical one”.

The complete failure of economic theory and subsequent data-driven models to predict, even imprecisely and inaccurately, black swan events such as the global finance sector catastrophe of 2007-8 and the ensuing global monetary crisis, is the result of both: truncations of empirical measurement data used in theoretical modeling; and the indoctrination of modern global culture into a system of theoretical and mechanical naivete.

In a very real sense, modern economic theory and models comprise a simplistic interpretation of the realities of political life; and generally, people place near-complete trust and reliance upon technologies that they misunderstand, or outright do not understand.

Groschl (2013) reports that recent annual meetings of the world economic forum at Davos have begun to recognize sustainable development not merely as a mechanical, technical process. Increasingly, behavior is seen as the missing link between analyses (providing knowledge of what is at stake) and implementation (doing something about it). He suggests that a transformation is occurring – or needs to occur, and calls upon his readers to realize that “not everything that counts can be counted and not everything that can be counted counts […]. One cannot rely too much on models and calculations. Instead one must rely on one’s intuition, and trust the intuitions of others”. In so saying, Groschl corroborates my own view, published as part of a previous post titled iconoclast which ends with a call for the realization that the greater part of reality is irrational – “irrationality is the denominator, and rationality the numerator”.

The mechanization of governance: expert systems – not even idiots
Hackett & Groschl speak of a transnational capitalist class (TCC) – the principal shareholders and managers of large corporations. These private businesses do not reside within a single nation, and thus are not bound by the laws and customs of any one nation, rather they are spread across several nations, the governing policies of which they tend to influence. In fact, Hackett & Groschl claim that the influence of transnational corporations has grown to become the core actor in governance discourse. Increasingly, developed states conduct peripheral, enabling roles, while developing countries have been entirely disenfranchised from the global agenda. Transnational corporations affect their influence upon the economies of most countries, and seem to play an ever increasing, albeit private and hidden role in international relations, together resulting in economic activities the scale of which are beyond the capacity of any one nation state. It is said that the power and reach of transnational business has in many ways surpassed the power and capacity of the United Nations.
Based upon the knowledge that people irrationally trust models, the understanding that government policy is strongly influenced by corporate interests, and that the governance of corporations is strongly influenced by economic theory and computer modeling, it seems reasonable to take the view that policy is increasingly being conducted by technological systems, most of which still employ people – albeit with the unrealistic assumption that human components of the politico-technological system are devoid of humanity; that they are perfectly rational actors.

The modern political state is thus modular, and most correctly defined as technocracy. Herein, warn Hackett & Groschl, lies a looming crisis of accountability. With the knowledge that corporate shareholders are not legally liable for the actions of the corporate person they own, and assuming the TCC as the global elite, economically governing group, who will hold the TCC and it’s individual members accountable? – and how?

One answer to this quandary is as predictable as it is incapable; artificial intelligence. Not the ‘general’ or ‘strong’ AI of science fiction, but decidedly unintelligent expert systems. The convergence of governance and expert systems is termed e-government – defined by the United Nations Global E-Government Readiness Report 2004, as “the use of [information and communication technology (ICT)] and its application by the government for the provision of information and public services to the people.”

Several aspects of governance, in business and government, have already been delegated to expert systems, as shown by the broader definition given in a more resent UN document, titled “E-Government for the Future We Want”:
“E-government can be referred to as the use and application of information technologies in public administration to streamline and integrate workflows and processes, to effectively manage data and information, enhance public service delivery, as well as expand communication channels for engagement and empowerment of people. The opportunities offered by the digital development of recent years, whether through online services, big data, social media, mobile apps, or cloud computing, are expanding the way we look at e-government. While e-government still includes electronic interactions of three types – i.e. government-to-government (G2G); government-to-business (G2B); and government-to-consumer (G2C) – a more holistic and multi-stakeholder approach is taking shape.”(25)

The Encyclopedia of Digital Government (2007), provides concrete examples of governance tasks performed by expert systems. “Increasingly, government organizations in the Netherlands use expert systems to make judicial decisions in individual cases under the Dutch General Administrative Law Act […]. Examples of judicial decisions made by expert systems are tax decisions, decisions under the Traffic Law Act (traffic fines), decisions under the General Maintenance Act (maintenance grants), and decisions under the Housing Assistance Act.

There are two categories of judicial expert systems. Expert systems in the first category support the process of judicial decision making by a civil servant. The decision is taken in “cooperation” between a computer and the civil servant. Expert systems in the second category draft judicial decisions without any human interference. In these cases the decision making process is fully automatic.”(26)

In 1989 J. Weintraub authored an article published in AI Magazine (note E), in which he lists twelve possible uses for experts systems in federal, state, and municipal governments.
1) Forecasting – financial planning and cash management
2) Labor relations
3) Document and archive retrieval
4) Regulatory compliance advise
5) Office automation
6) Capital assets analysis
7) Personnel employment assessment
8) Legal advice
9) Instruction
10) Bid and proposal preparation assistance
11) Natural language querying of database
12) Auditing

Further, Weintraub stated that “the applicability of expert systems and AI to government administration can be seen in a careful ‘between the lines’ reading of the Information Systems Plan (ISP). Although not explicitly stated, many of the systems and projects defined in ISP are driven by extensive and complex logic processes and would benefit from AI technology.”(27) This is more than a little humorous, as expert systems are thoroughly incapable of reading “between the lines”, in a sense proving the necessity of humans, whether expert or not, for the interpretation of real-world situations and to propose solutions that better, or at least maintain, a decent quality of life.

In this regard I speak from personal experience, having been subjected, rather frustratingly, to the stress-inducing ridiculousness of the expert system employed by the royal Dutch tax department. In regular correspondence with the Dutch tax system, it failed to remind me of a chat bot only twice during the course of six years – due on both occasions to the intervention of a (human) civil servant. The expert governor (Dutch tax bot) consistently appraised the situation incorrectly, whereas a layman (myself) and civil servant (tax inspector) appraised the situation correctly. The Dutch computer expert governor, a rational specialist, managed very well only to reduce the quality of my life, by not incorporating into the situation argument, the information that I had sent to it.

Apparently, the current culture of deference of individual responsibilities of governance to a group of ‘representative’ strangers, is not dysfunctional enough. Modern culture seeks to defer individual responsibilities of governance even further, feeding them to unintelligent expert systems. While I can imagine the presumed attraction of this course of action, if viewed superficially and from a disinterested distance, my own experiences have proven that deference of governance to machine systems, makes for singularly poor policy, resulting in absurd decision making. Expert systems have no understanding of the knowledge they house, nor of how the implementation of that knowledge impacts upon the quality of people’s lives. Indeed, this is part of the attraction – we hope to better our lives by employing selfless, unbiased, ‘incorruptible’, perfectly rational machines as civil servants; as our governors. A warning! Expert (governing) systems are not intelligent, in fact they are not even idiots.

There may be a glimmer of hope however, in the incorporation and interrelation of several expert systems, representing a diversity of specializations, thus synthesizing a multi-expert system; a diversified-specialized system; a computerized polymath. Such a system would not be intelligent, but it might be capable of more rounded, complex, decision making, which in turn may lead to more livable forms of governance for humans. However, the only sure way to attain a good quality of life is to personally, individually, abandon the current culture of technocratic lock-in (‘representative democracy’), and to begin to govern oneself in association with ones local group, resources, and territory.

A) For the purpose of this essay, the word cell is assumed to be synonymous with actor, and the latter may refer to molecular as well as systemic agents of action.

B) Take for example the report by Cordero (2012), in which is stated: “A common strategy among microbes living in iron-limited environments is the secretion of siderophores, which can bind poorly soluble iron and make it available to cells via active transport mechanisms. Such siderophore-iron complexes can be thought of as public goods that can be exploited by local communities and drive diversification […]” – italicized emphasis is mine.

C) Of course ‘water’ may be replaced with any object or process.

D) Hamilton’s rule (rB > C) was published in 1964, as a popularization of the mathematical treatment of kin selection, by Fisher and Haldane in the 1930’s, and a further formal mathematical treatment, a theorem, composed by Price.
r = genetic relatedness of the recipient to the actor.
B = benefit gained by the recipient as a result of the act.
C = cost of the act to the actor.

E) Elsevier publishes an entire journal devoted to the field of expert systems in governance, titled “Expert Systems with Applications” []. Here are two recent (2012 and 2015) citations:
i) “Evaluation and ranking of risk factors in public–private partnership water supply projects in developing countries using fuzzy synthetic evaluation approach”
ii) “An unstructured information management system (UIMS) for emergency management”

1) C. Woese, “The universal ancestor”, (1998), Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America, vol. 95(12), p. 6854-9, (abstract)

2) F. Miller, “Aristotle’s Political Theory”, (2012), The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy,

3) E. Jenks, “A History of Politics”, (1909), p.73,

4) S. Groschl et al, “Uncertainty, Diversity and The Common Good”, (2013), Gower,

5) J. Scott, “Critical Assessments of Leading Political Philosophers”, (2006), p. 421, Routledge,,+sed+in+his+quae+bene+secundum+naturam+se+habent,+considerandum+est+quid+sit+naturale&source=bl&ots=vLYRv0Xyl-&sig=JMpCOrRPx15W-We6lS-cvR1s9pE&hl=sl&sa=X&ved=0CC4Q6AEwAmoVChMIuNj85ce1xwIVCaZyCh339QR_#v=onepage&q=Non%20in%20depravatis%2C%20sed%20in%20his%20quae%20bene%20secundum%20naturam%20se%20habent%2C%20considerandum%20est%20quid%20sit%20naturale&f=false

6) J. Twenge & W. Campbell, “The Narcissism Epidemic:Living in the Age of Entitlement”, (2009), Free Press,

7) Aristotle, “Politics (Book 1)”, (1957), Aristotle in 23 Volumes, Vol. 21, translated by H. Rackham, Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press,

8) F. Short et al, “Polybacterial human disease: the ills of social networking”, (2014), Vol. 22-9, p. 508-518, Trends in Microbiology, Elsevier,





13) C. Cowden, “Game Theory, Evolutionary Stable Strategies and the Evolution of Biological Interactions”, (2012), Nature – Education,


15) T. Foxon, “Technological and institutional ‘lock-in’ as a barrier to sustainable innovation”, (2002), Imperial College London,

16) R. Dawkins, “The Selfish Gene”, (1976), Oxford University Press.

17) A. Grafen, “Natural Selection, Kin Selection and Group Selection”, (1984), Behavioural ecology: an evolutionary approach, Vol. 2,

18) M. Wade, “Group selection among laboratory populations of Tribolium”, (1976), Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, Vol. 73-12, p. 4604-4607,

19) M. Wade, “Group Selection, Population Growth Rate, and Competitive Ability in the Flour Beetles, Tribolium Spp.”, (1980), Ecology, Vol. 61-5, p. 1056-1064, Ecological Society of America, abstract

20) V. Huges, “Epigenetics: The sins of the father”, (2014), Nature, Vol. 507-7490,

21) M. Reuter, et al, “Investigating the genetic basis of altruism: the role of the COMT Val158Met polymorphism”, (2010), Social Cognitive and Affective Neuroscience,

22) G. Thompson, et al, “Genes underlying altruism”, (2013), Biology Letters, The Royal Society,

23) J. Mayfield et al, “Recent advances in bacterial heme protein biochemistry”, (2011), Current Opinion in Chemical Biology, Vol. 15, p. 260–266, Science Direct,

24) “Rosennean Complexity and other interests”, (2008), Panmere,

25) “UNITED NATIONS E-GOVERNMENT SURVEY 2014 – E-Government for the Future We Want”, (2014), Untied Nations New York,

26) M. Groothuis, “Applying ICTs in Judicial Decision Making by Government Agencies”, (2007), Encyclopedia of Digital Government, p. 87-96,

27) J. Weintraub, “Expert Systems in Government Administration”, (1989), AI Magazine Vol. 10/1, Association for the Advancement of Artificial Intelligence,

Fog of Genius

Nobly reasonable? Infinitely facultative? Angelic and Godly?!
Wow! What a piece of work was Shakespeare!
But was he a genius? Was Bach, Da Vinci, or Einstein?
What do we mean by use of the word genius?

In this, the first of four posts, the intention is to again push off from the comfort and normalcy of home port. This time to explore the most slippery o’eels! Our journey begins in a deep contextual fog, of historical, theistic, and social themes; tricky navigation to be sure! Once out of the ‘fog’, our objective, or bias, will be to explore the cultural islands Intelligence, Creativity, and Mental illness, and to interrelate them via cellular biology generally, and astroglial function specifically.

The subject matter is seemingly impossible; a vast ocean of reported (known), unreported (unknown), and living (tenacious and malleable) ideas. A rather less than more reliable volume! Aware of the bias – of our direction – mediated intentionally by sails, rudder, and navigator, and as much again, and more, without intent, by swells and gales and monsters unknown…

Qui_vive ?

Deep cultural time
The word genius is derived from the Latin gigno, from the Ancient Greek γίγνομαι ‎(gígnomai, “to come into being, to be born, to take place”). Oddly, the word genius is also recognized as a Romanized version of the Arabic jinni or djinni (“hidden from sight”), from which is derived majnūn (“one whose intellect is hidden”, “mad”). Also, the pre-Islamic jinnaye (“good and rewarding gods”). A sentiment similar to that apprehended by pangan animism.

The jinn or djinn are Arabian mythological creatures who inhabit an unseen world beyond the known universe. Apparently, in the Quran, jinn are composed of a smokeless, scorching fire, and in the Torah (Christian “Old Testament”), as seraphim and cherubim (“burning/fiery ones”). The jinn, humans and angels are said to make up the three sapient creations of God. Like humans, the jinn have free will note A, and so may have a good, evil, or neutral disposition. The latter, mischievous or evil spirits were called shaytan jinn, and are also described as demons. Interestingly, phenomena that in ancient times were thought to result from possession by a shaytan, are in modernity defined as psychosis, schizotypy, or outright schizophrenia. All as stigmatizing now as they were a millennium ago, during the intellectual darkness, indeed exorcism, of the middle ages.

Closely related, in form and function, to the jinn, seraphim and cherubim, are the Karabu, Shedu and Lammasu of Assyria, Babylon and Phoenicia, respectively. All are depicted as sapient hybrid animals, varyingly described as:
– the likeness of four living creatures;
– each with four faces (the face of a man, the face of a lion on the right side, the face of an ox on the left side, and the face of an eagle) and four wings, with straight feet with a sole like the sole of a calf’s foot, and hands of a man under their wings;
– six-winged beings that fly around the Throne of God crying “holy, holy, holy”;
– a lion or bull with eagles’ wings and a human face;
– having a king’s head, a bull’s body, and an eagle’s wings;
– human-headed winged lion (Sphinx);
– eagle-headed winged lion (Griffin).

Ezekiel’s vision – the marking of this image is incorrect. According to the literature, the two objects labeled “Angels” are cherubs
Another representation of cherubs flying with the throne of God
A representation of a Seraph
A pair of Lamassu

Interestingly, all of these fantastical creatures are described, almost exclusively, as powerful protective deities. For example, cherubim first appear in the Christian bible, in the Garden of Eden, as guards of the way to the Tree of life – possibly also the Tree of knowledge.

Classical and Enlightened soles
Animism represents a unity of spirit and material. Thus, in pagan antiquity, souls or spirits were not restricted to the human condition, but were also intrinsic to other animals, as well as plants, rocks, mountains, rivers, even thunder, wind, shadows, the sun, the moon and planets, etc… In his treaties on the nature of living things, “De Anima“, Aristotle pointed to the soul as the form and essence of a living thing. Thus the soul was assumed not to be a distinct substance from the body, and a body without a soul was unintelligible.

For love of empire, all good Romans worshiped the genius of Rome – the divine power protecting the Roman empire, Rome itself, and its heroic leaders and emperors. Likewise, the genius of a family, or house, was a protector and guide, an inspiring supernatural spirit which took care of house and family, and was the object of worship.1

Early in the 17th century, believing that a divine spirit had revealed new philosophies to him, Descartes suggested that the mind, spirit, or soul, is composed of a nonphysical substance, which he identified with consciousness and self-awareness. Unlike Aristotle, Descartes distinguished these spiritual aspects from a physical (material) brain. Hence, the dualism in modem philosophy of mind, and the resulting mind-body problem. Substance dualism is famously defended by Descartes’ “Je pense, donc je suis”, arguing that the mental substance can exist outside of the body and that the body cannot think. This philosophical stance, a belief held almost ubiquitously in modern culture, has allowed for the conception of artificial intelligence, hypothetically assumed to come into existence as a product of machine mediated computation of abstract (nonphysical) algorithms.

Late in the 18th century, expanding upon a theme related to substance dualism, Emmanuel Kant argued that experience is structured by the mind. He had published “Critique of Pure Reason” in response to the philosophical rift that had developed between empiricists – who believe that knowledge is fundamentally rooted in sensory experience, and rationalists – who believe that knowledge is fundamentally rooted in reasoning. In attempting to resolve the issue, Kant leaned toward the latter, a priori knowledge and reasoning. He suggested that the mind comprises necessary structures the function of which is to internalize the physical sensations, which are comprehended via synthesis with reasoned structures. It is this understanding of mental primacy in comprehension and conceptualization that gives way to what he called anshcauung, which we may call intuition, imagination, visualization, or insight.

Arthur Miller (2000) has identified this concept in his exploration of the role of insight in the sciences. In particular, Miller focuses upon Kantian anshcauung and anschaulichkeit (“visualizability”) in physics, proposing that “Anschaulichkeit refers to properties of an object, which exist whether or not we look at it or make measurements on it.” And that “anschaulichkeit is immediately given to the perceptions or what is readily graspable in the anschauung.” Furthermore, anshcauung is raised up from anschaulichkeit, and “visual imagery” (anschaulichkeit) is inferior to visualization (anshcauung).2 It is possibly this Kantian epistemic quagmire that has frightened so many quantum physicists into a strictly calculating corner, from which one often hears comments such as Don’t look for meaning, just do the math and you’ll get the right answer.

The Prussian general and military theorist, Carl Philipp Gottfried von Clausewitz, emphasized the importance, in war, of immeasurable “moral forces” (i.e. all influences on events not material in nature: the morale and experience of the troops, or the skill of the general, for example, as opposed to the number of troops, quality and quantity of arms, etc…). He posed that the immeasurability of moral factors created a difficult dilemma: “theoretical calculations would either have to be inaccurate (excluding moral forces) or impossible to carry through rationally […], since they included indeterminate quantities.”

This rational ignorance is precisely the strategy of modernity, most clearly visible in business, economics, and in the sciences. Generally, we calculate based upon measurable phenomena, assuming that the immeasurable (irrational) phenomena will magically balance, rendering no net influence. Simplified, abstracted, and linear; rational theories attempt to describe non-linear and complex real-world phenomena. The analysis of models is useful, but immersive indoctrination in them tends to a belief that the model (theory) is reality.
“The very nature of genius is to rise above rules. However, any theory proposing rules not good enough for genius – rules which genius can disregard would conflict with reality, for it would set theory in conflict with genius, and the successful actions of geniuses are part of the reality which theory ought to help us understand and explain.” note B
– Carl Philipp Gottfried von Clausewitz (cca 1820)

However, “one never rises above the rules, if the rules are correct”. note C
The decisions to which a person is lead by genius, will be entirely consistent with correct rules (theory), but theories which exclude genius (i.e. the moral, irrational, immeasurable) from the rule, are reprehensible. Von Clausewitz attempted a definition of genius, posing it to be the application of rules in situations where key data are not apparent. Expanding upon this, one might say genius is recognized as action taken in accordance with an intuitive conceptualization (that is, an unknown or hidden, and thus irrational, mental model), based upon fragmentary evidence. Here neither intuition, nor genius, are taken as being synonymous with ‘rising above the rules’, rather with the extraction of meaning from current patterns, based upon experience, but without necessarily being able to define those patterns.

Here, Herr von Clausewitz suggests subconscious computation – a form of signal processing and information ‘chunking’ that occurs in our minds without our direct awareness. He alludes to the same concept again, saying: “The rules of war, like those of grammar, can be derived inductively. This may provide the ability to reach the right conclusions without the need to learn the rules abstractly or apply them analytically.” Indeed, he has used the word “subrational” to describe a significant component of genius, allowing for a rapid recognition of truth, which the mind would normally miss. The majority of genius, he ascribed to stubbornness, “tremendous determination”, an overcoming of fear and social friction.3

In concord with von Clausewitzian rule breaking, and with Henri Poincaré’s “special aesthetic sensibility”, Miller writes “just as in art, discoveries in science are made by breaking the rules”, and suggests that “in network thinking, concepts from apparently disparate disciplines are combined by proper choice of mental image or metaphor to catalyze the nascent moment of creativity. This necessarily nonlinear thought process can occur unconsciously, and not necessarily in real time.” Miller also reminds us of Poincaré’s description of scientific creativity, as the “the process in which the human mind seems to borrow least from the exterior world, in which it acts, or appears to act, only by itself and on itself.”

An example of a similar phenomenon may be made of not learning by rote (i.e. learning, but not by memorizing through mechanical repetition, not by hearing and repeating aloud, not without full attention to comprehension or thought for the meaning). Poincaré and Einstein both expressed difficulty in memorizing material that had no clear patterns, or was not inducible from first principles (a priori reasoning).

Learning by rote seems to be for those who can not see the truth.

Hereditary genius
Francis Galton, cousin of Charles Darwin, in 1868 published a bestselling Hereditary Genius. Robert Nesbit (1976) has defined Galton’s concept as “a special intellectual and spiritual power that is inherent in a given person’s nature and that transmits itself to succeeding generations through the germ plasm – until or unless, that is, this genealogy becomes corrupted through interbreeding with inferior physical and mental types.”

The meaning here (i.e. a eugenic caste) fascinates as much as frightens me note D because I hold an inexorable faith in free will, and because I closely relate the reality of the human condition to biology generally, and particularly to the sociobiology of certain insects and microbes.
“Capacity for intense and sustained concentration of the mind is also one of the qualities seen oftener in the great than in other people.”
– Nesbit (1976)

Nesbit’s interpretation is one of temporal, rather than hierarchal displacement. He quotes Goethe:
“If a talent is to develop quickly and joyously, it is essential that there be in circulation throughout the scene an abundance of productive genius and of sound culture…. We admire the tragedies of the ancient Greeks, but upon proper examination we should admire the period more than the individual author. [No doubt, there is] the occasional exception, the mind of great creative force. […] This rare individual through reading, fantasy, and sheer imagination creates his own milieu. […] Great ages in the history of culture are made by their great component individuals, but the reverse is also true, that in large degree great individuals are made by great ages and by all the intellectual circuits.”

“The intellectual and moral milieu created by multitudes of self-centered, cultivated personalities was necessary for the evolution of that spirit of intelligence… that formed the motive power of the Renaissance. […] Ages of genius have truth, beauty, and goodness emblazoned on them, not modernism, post-modernism, and futurism.”

Nesbit describes the concept of milieu as a fusion of consciousness with environment.4 More specifically, the meaning of milieu is interpreted as part of the larger environment, that is simultaneously participated in, shaped by, and swept into, the individual’s consciousness. He continues, saying “Every individual above the [intellectual] level of moron is from time to time excited emotionally and intellectually by the people and things around him. It is a fair statement that the highly talented are the most excited in this way, and whether it is a poem or a scientific theory, what we witness is the capacity to internalize a social experience and to make the product socially available. […] Galton did not err in his linking of geniuses by family and genealogy; where he went wrong was in limiting family to physical genealogy rather than seeing it as […] the whole social order – social, cultural, moral, and intellectual entities, as well as a continuity of germ plasm. Heredity, yes, but that word is also properly used when prefaced by the word social.”

Rather than affluence, “a closeness of the generations”, intellectual and moral intimacy between parent and child, a form of apprenticeship, “assimilation of the many psychological and social insights, understandings, skills and techniques”. These, Nesbit posed, are of vital importance in the formation of genius.

“What is true of individuals is also true for peoples. By common assent the three most talented peoples of the past two and a half millenniums have been the Chinese, the Greeks, and the Jews. […] In all three, the family extended itself into all aspects of the individual mind, becoming the nursery of education, moral precept, citizenship, piety, and craft skill.”

There are darker aspects of the familial milieu also. Nesbit lists greed, fratricide, incest, and other evils, and interestingly, argues that “murder is the price to be paid, along with incest, blood feud, and other linked evils, for the uniquely intimate atmosphere of family, and it is, on the evidence of history, a price that should be paid. Better a society in which these specific evils will always exist as the consequence of the family tie than one on which, in order to abolish the evils, the family itself is abolished.”

“One can somehow live with the evils, but civilization could hardly exist without the nurturing ground of its geniuses.”

Bibliography and Notes
note A) Angels are not reported to have been endowed with free will, making them seem rather machinelike. For fear of prosecution, and because I feel the issue has little of significance to offer our current exploration, I shall refrain from commenting on this curious finding.

note B) A similar argument can be made for authority – it is unnecessary to challenge the authority, if the authority is correct.

note C) The meaning of this passage is strikingly similar to that of Gödel’s incompleteness theorems, authored a century later, in 1931.

note D) A good argument might be made for the existence of social castes within our current world population; a topic not explored here.

1) R. Rushdooney, “The Ideas of Genius”, (1972), Chalcedon Report, vol. 78,

2) A. Miller, “Insights of Genius”, (2000), MIT press.

3) C. Rogers, “Clausewitz, Genius and the Rules”, (2002), The Journal of Military History, Vol. 66, p. 1167-1176,

4) R. Nisbet, “Genius”, (1976), The Wilson Quarterly, Vol 6, p. 98 – 107, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars,

Moral Deference of Sustainability

Explored in this and the following two posts, are connections between cultural morality, sustainable development, and iconoclasm.

In my worldview the term sustainable development (sustainability) has a clear definition, equivalent with that of homeostasis. There are various definitions of the latter, my meaning relates generally to biological physiology; the set of physical characteristics comprising life-functions and life-forms observable in biology.

In my personal view the issue is less clear, cloaked in irrational and unknowable metaphysics:

Sustainability is a volume of persistent flux, a disequilibrium, an entropy-reducing physical change, created by, mediated by, and sustained as interactions between complex physical objects with the capacity to individually and collectively self-organize and self-regulate.

Not fantastic, but phenomenal. Seemingly improbable but apparently common and persistent here on Earth.

The Earth may not be viewed as an independent physiology, because the Sun plays an essential role in sustaining nearly all planetary life systems; certainly the large, highly complex ones. Hypothetically, given at least the Sun and Earth, one might begin to imagine a large and complex ‘self-sustaining’ physiology.
Interpreted holistically, sustainability refers to a single untied living system. If we are to accept this premise, we must assume that the purpose of any thoughts, discussions and/or actions on the subject of sustainable development, are to sustain life, not necessarily lives, on Earth. This is an important distinction; an aspect of biological reality which we modern cosmopolitans tend to ignore, choosing instead to fool ourselves into the belief that each life (individual organism) is of paramount importance.

Both, common sense and thermodynamics show that sustaining any kind of object and/or action indefinitely, is not possible. Certainly not as part of an energetically closed system. For the purpose of the current argument the solar system might be imagined as a hypothetically ‘closed system’. There seems little room for doubt that given enough time to develop, the Sun, Earth, life, everything.., will grind down to near-equilibrium, following as closely as possible:
the path of least resistance.

It seems most reasonable to address sustainable development selfishly (anthropocentrically), and practicably (feasibly). From this it follows that we hope to sustain at least one viable culture of H. sapiens on Earth. Attempting to put a ‘use-by-date’ on H. sapiens is beyond the scope of this text. Currently, we focus upon our contemporary period, with one eye toward the past, and the other toward a reasonably visible future.1 Of course, anthropocentrically, I hope and trust that many happy days precede me, and us all! That is to say, I hold faith in the adaptability and resourcefulness of our species.

When imagining a sustainable culture of H. sapiens on Earth, I can not help but think of ‘the old ways’. Pre-industrial renaissance, or better, semi-industrial societies such as the Amish described in an earlier post of this series, titled The Worldly and The Amish; possibly parochial, though not necessarily Christian or even religious, reproductive population(s) of fit, adaptable, social, creative and analytical, generalists; survivors.

It is my opinion that we currently live in a golden age, perhaps The golden age of humankind. Life has never before been so easy and good for so many of our species, and there are many of us. Very many more of us, however, aspire to the globally endorsed and internationally accepted social and economic norms. I shall be blunt; there are too many of us. Assuming that our global population will continue to increase during the next few decades, then begin to stabilize by about 2060 with an estimated population of between 9 and 10 billion individuals, any definition or proposal of ‘sustainable development’ including the idea of sustaining current standards and aspirations is necessarily false; unattainable as long as our population number is static or positive. Actual sustainable development presupposes that either our population or our expectations, or both, decrease.

Neither pessimism nor optimism, but realism is required in order simply to see what the sustainability puzzle really is about. It seems not to be simply a set of choices we stand to make; sustainability is probably not a consumer good. Instead, the issue appears to comprise a set of physical factors, together acting to limit population growth of H. sapiens on Earth. I would not wish a life at carrying capacity upon anyone; the concept contrasts against my selfish hope and trust for a sustained good life.

Modern conceptions of sustainable development derive from a seminal text2 on the subject. This document, also known as ‘the Brundtland report’, called for: ”a common spirit of responsibility” and ”for new norms of behaviour at all levels and in the interests of all. [Changes in attitudes, in social values, and in aspirations]”.

Yet the definition endorsed by our institutions, the political and corporate sectors, itself stemming from the same seminal document, is: “development that meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs”.

Prosaic as this may seem, it is obvious that any serious consideration of sustainable development must define and take into account the needs of the present. I thus challenge the reader to identify their own current needs, and to compare these with their own current state of wealth. Personally, I have come to realize that the vast majority of aspects identified as necessary within the lifestyles of modern globalized culture, are unnecessary. Furthermore, I have over the past seven or so years begun to subtract superfluous aspects from my lifestyle. This gradual personal process has, and continues, to lead to what appears from the outside to be quite radical change, in both, my thoughts and actions.

Moral Deference
”[The] answers to fundamental and serious concerns are not at hand, there is no alternative but to keep on trying to find them.”
– the Brundtland report

Contemporary representative democracies are based upon the premise of deference of responsibility. By casting a vote, the voter actively defers his or her personal responsibility to govern the society of which they are a part, to a ‘political representative’. The ‘representative’ is thus assumed to act instead of, and as a proxy for, the voter. A political representative is usually a person or group, endorsed by a political platform, business, or coalition thereof, and is in the vast majority of cases disconnected from a personal understanding of the voter. This kind of deference of responsibility is accepted, more or less unquestioningly, by people comprising modern democratic society, as a normative cultural moral.

”major changes [are] needed, both in attitudes and in the way our societies are organized”.
– the Brundtland report.

Let us define moral as: ”[the] principles of right and wrong in behaviour, especially for teaching right behaviour” and ”conforming to a standard of right behaviour; sanctioned by or operative on one’s conscience or ethical judgment”.3

I have only recently realized that morality is relative to contemporary cultural conditions. Please consider the following three examples:

i) The construction of a “permanent repository” for nuclear waste at Onkalo.
Into Eternity is a documentary film which does a remarkably good job of describing the challenges intrinsic to discussions of sustainable development; we can not know what will occur in the millennia that follow us, nevertheless we are deferring the difficult end of the nuclear waste problem, by the conviction that we can construct a situation of ‘permanent safety’.
– the first tick mark on the left indicates the construction of the great pyramid of Giza (2560 BC); the second tick mark indicates 0 AD; the third tick mark indicates 2010 AD. The span between the third and fourth tick marks represents the period for which Onkalo must last, many times longer than the oldest structures built by humanity have ever existed.

ii) The translocation of Abu Simbel by UNESCO.
“[From the outset UNESCO played a role in the promotion and rescue of historic sites. Postwar reconstruction of Europe, from 1945 to 1955, initiated as the large-scale restoration of war-torn cities. Concern at the scale of war damage was such that the Hague Convention produced in 1954 a convention on the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict. A handful of years later international concern was raised by the construction of the Aswan High Dam in Egypt, which would flood the valley containing the Abu Simbel and other temples, significant relics of ancient Egypt. In 1959, following an appeal from Egypt and Sudan, UNESCO instigated a major conservation programme which involved intensive archaeological excavations and the removal, stone by stone, of the temples that were reconstructed on higher ground above the flood line.]“4

An archeological construction project, spanning two decades and costing a quarter of a billion dollars (accounting for inflation to present), the purpose of which is to translocate a temple by 200 meters due to the construction of a dam, does not feel like the kind of thing that would constitute a contemporary moral obligation. At this time there seem to be more pressing moral obligations, such as the ‘bailing out’ of the global banking system, and of Greece.
It is fascinating and revealing to come to terms with the ridiculousness of our institutionalized moral acts. “Five years after coalition troops invaded Iraq, the Iraq Museum is still closed, […] some 8,000 objects remain unaccounted for. Archaeological sites, including the iconic remains of Babylon and Ur, continue to be neglected or damaged. […] Much has already been written about damage to the Iraqi cultural heritage [the legacy of one the earliest civilizations on Earth] as a direct result of the Second Gulf War […]. Apart from the Iraqis themselves, […] many foreign organizations and individuals have been involved, directly or indirectly, in what has happened.”5

iii) The Apollo program.
Equally perplexing from our current cultural situation is the prospect of spending nearly 110 billion dollars (accounting for inflation to present)6 in order to send a handful of people to the moon for a walkabout.

Disposable morality?
Habitus and praxis are introduced as part of a previous post in this series, titled Nous Kairos. Currently, we explore what appears to be a moral incongruence regarding sustainable development. Let us begin, however, by assuming the reverse; thus hypothesizing that the contemporary cultural moral, which is associated with sustainable development, is one of congruence between habitus and praxis.

It seems clear that our modern global culture now includes a moral obligation to strive for sustainability, and so this ethic necessarily plays a central role in our collective habitus. Examples of ‘doing the right thing’ in regard to environment, biodiversity, poverty, war, violence, governance, education, healthcare, consumption, etc… abound in our culture. The vast majority of us, modern cosmopolitans, are convinced that we do ‘Green’ by buying ‘Green’; a recent car commercial stated:
“C4 = 0g.CO2

This is a blatant lie. In fact, it is not a lie resting upon a lie?
Not only is it physically impossible for a car to equal 0g CO2 but the premise upon which this kind of marketing rests (i.e. that global climate change can be stopped or mitigated by a reduction of environmental carbon dioxide) is also a lie.7 Furthermore, peculiarly, as if with purpose, the format of the advertised equation is not correct.
Though technically incorrect, this equation should read: C4 = 0g CO2

Generally, in connection with sustainable development, we excuse ourselves from a similar moral obligation in praxis, by simple assertions of practical inconvenience (impracticality). So it may be said that, in our time, sustainable development exists virtually – ‘on paper’ and ‘in theory’ – but is a practical impossibility.

Commuters, for example, are morally obliged to think about and communicate modes of transportation other than car driving; such as walking, bicycling, motorcycling, use of public transport, velomobiling, horse riding, ox&cart, etc.., but generally feel, and are morally excused from actual realization of these alternatives due to a supposition, or imposition, of practical impossibility; even car pooling is generally assumed to be inconvenient. Proof of this is evident in rush hour car traffic congestion, if not car traffic congestion generally.

The contemporary cultural moral is one of ideas, thoughts, plans (visions) about sustainability, but is largely not one of practice. The latter is actively deferred (disposed) to an unknown future generation. Implicit but unspoken, in this moral deference is the assumption that a supposed (envisioned) sustainable cultural moral will exist at some future time, by people other than us, as a congruence between moral ideas about the kinds of action that must be executed in order for H. Sapiens to sustain a viable population on Earth, and the actual execution of those acts.

Perhaps, in order to realize sustainable development, it is necessary for people, collectively, to change the contemporary cultural moral? In order for sustainable development to become a reality, moral congruence between habitus and praxis is necessary – at least in theory. The process of attaining such a cultural moral congruence will necessarily include wide-sweeping changes in social organization and regulation, in order to better facilitate the practical possibilities of the nascent cultural moral.

Bibliography and Notes
1) Interestingly, keeping one metaphorical eye on the past and the other on a probable future, a third is necessary in order to focus on the present.

2) World Commission on Environment and Development, “Report of the World Commission on Environment and Development: Our Common Future”, (1987), Oxford University Press,


4) N. Sykes, R. Hewison, (1987), “Sustainability in the Arts and Humanities”, The heritage industry: Britain in a climate of decline, London:Methuen, via The University of Nottingham, Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-ShareAlike UK 2.0 Licence.

5) “The 2003 invasion and aftermath”, (2008), Trustees of the British Museum,

6) “Project Apollo: A Retrospective Analysis”, (2014), NASA,

7) Global climate change appears to be a cyclical phenomenon of periodic glaciations, stretching at least several hundred thousand years into Earth’s history. So it might be safe to assume that climate change (cycles of global warming and global cooling) is sustainable. Volumes have been written on the subject of global climate change, I shall not focus upon it here, other than to mention that it is of fundamental relevance to sustainable development.

Knowledge Generator

It is what it is
“The individuals credited with the introduction of philosophical thought into human civilizations were men who speculated on what constitutes the objects of human experience in so far as those objects have or involve an existence or being independent of what [any given agent, be it gods or human beings] may think, feel or do. The philosophers, in other words, are those individuals who are credited with introducing into human thought the idea of reality, or something which ‘is what it is’ on its own grounds, regardless of what further relations it may have ‘to us’ or how it may appear in experience.” – John Deely (2001)

It is perhaps more the norm than the exception for university life-science majors to be instructed, at the outset of their studies, that “science only studies observable phenomena. It functions in the realm of matter and energy [and therefore] it is a serious mistake to think that the methods of science can be applied in areas of investigation involving other aspects of human experience, e.g., matters of the mind”. However, “most neuroscientists and philosophers now take for granted that all biological phenomena, including consciousness, are properties of matter . . . and some philosophers and many neuroscientists believe that consciousness is an illusion”. And so a rather fascinating question arises: How did modern science – the communal knowledge-generating system par excellence – arrive at this sterile impasse – one where the investigation of individual knowledge-generating systems (minds) as knowledge-generating systems per se has come to be seen, at best, as a vexingly paradoxical riddle and, at worst, as falling entirely outside the scope of legitimate scientific inquiry?(1a)

A little more concisely: minds are unscientific.
A search using terms describing study of science such as “scienceology” returned only “scientology” entries. Apparently there is no meta-science, or science of science.(note i)

Biological prerequisite for knowledge
“Knowledge-generation requires opportunities for systemic self-correction, recursive iteration, and continual adaptive growth” – Donald Favareau (2010)

Systemic self-correction is exemplified by the proofreading capability of ribosomes, the action of immune systems, the healing of wounds, the regulation of emotions…

Recursive iteration is exemplified by the copying of physical genetic materials (DNA or RNA), its transcription to physical messengers (mRNA), childbirth, trial-and-error…

Continual adaptive growth(note ii) is exemplified by the evolution of species, a tree growing through a fence, the subtle changes in the morphology of quorum sensing signaling molecules that allow for the exclusion of cheaters in a bacterial colony…

These three concepts seem fairly straightforward, and clearly describe aspects of living systems. Indeed one may fairly argue that they are necessary for the continuation of any living system, and so are more than concepts(note iii), they must exist in the reality external to minds.

Knowledge-generation is a rather more mysterious concept, a compound of generation (similar to iteration) and knowledge. The meaning of the latter is not at all clear, and invokes feelings of awareness, consciousness, certainty, and experience – all of which are subjective states of minds. Is knowledge necessary for the continuation of a living system, such as an ant nest? Is knowledge necessary for the continuation of a formal system of logic, such as a computer program? In both cases I would argue that it is, and that examples might be made of the various epigenetic phenomena in living systems, and the symbolic representation of data stored in the working memories of formal systems.

Prior to the Hellenistic period, the word σημεῖον (Latin: semeion) was understood by the Greeks almost exclusively as a medical term, roughly akin to the modern concept of symptom, referring to the outward manifestation of an internal state. A sign – something that suggests the presence or existence of some other fact, quality or quantity.
Donald Favareau
Donald Favareau – circa 2010

Biosemiotics is defined as “the study of the myriad forms of communication and signification observable both within and between living systems. It is thus the study of representation, meaning, sense, and the biological significance of sign processes from intercellular signaling processes to animal display behavior to human semtotic artifacts such as language and abstract symbolic thought. Such sign processes appear ubiquitously in the literature on biological systems. Up until very recently, however, it had been implicitly assumed that the use of terms such as message, signal, code, and sign with respect to non-linguistic biological processes was ultimately metaphoric, and that such terms could someday effectively be reduced to the mere chemical and physical interactions underlying such processes. As the prospects for such a reduction become increasingly untenable, even in theory, the interdisciplinary research project of biosemiotics is attempting to re-open the dialogue across the life sciences – as well as between the life sciences and the humanities – regarding what, precisely, such in eliminable terms as representation, sign of, and meaning might refer to in the context of living, interactive, complex adaptive systems”(1b)

Assuming that human minds did not arise ex nihilo (from nothing), some far more fundamental form of mind (subjective experience) must be occurring within and between living systems. A handful of relatively new fields of study, including: neurophilosophy, evolutionary psychology, dynamic systems theory, cognitive neuroscience, and artificial intelligence/artificial life, are attempting to reframe two age-old questions:
“What is the relation between mental experience, biological organization, and the law-like processes of inanimate matter?” and “How does the human brain produce the mind?”

In accordance with modern scientific understanding, the phenotype(note iv) of a living system is the product of its evolutionary and ontogenetic embedding in the environment, and it consists of precisely those sets of systemic relations that serve to organize material substrates into that particular living system. I am speaking of living systems rather than organisms because life rarely, if ever, comprises a single organism. Much more common, if not ubiquitous, are the various forms of symbiosis:

Commensalism – a relationship where one species obtains nourishment and/or shelter from another species, and does not harm or help the other species.
Mutualism – a relationship where both species benefit from the relationship.
Parasitism – a relationship between two species in which one species (the parasite) obtains nourishment and/or shelter to the disadvantage of the other species (the host).(2)

“Biological organization and agency of every kind, is precisely the naturalistic establishment of sign relations that ‘bridge’ subject-dependent experience (such as we find both in animal sensations as well as in human ‘mindedness’) with the inescapable subject-independent reality of alterity – an alterity that all organisms have to find some way to successfully perceive and act upon in order to maintain themselves in existence.”
– Favareau

The narrow path of logic – a short history
Aristotle’s vision of biology (represented as a group of texts titled De Anima) included an interdependent recursivity:
a) A phenotype is the product of a living system’s interaction with the world, and vice-versa.
b) The actions of a living system upon the world (which subsequently change that world) are both enabled by and constrained by the systemic biological constitution of the living system, including its perceptual capacities.
c) As the result of (a) and (b) there is both a “realism” to sign relations and a deep necessity for the joining together of the extra-biological relations of external reality to the embedded biological relations within living systems such that what occurs in the case of the perceiving [system] is conceivably analogous to what holds true in […] the things themselves”.

Anicius Manlius Severinus Boethius was born into the Roman aristocracy, circa 480 AD. BoethiusHis social position ensured that he acquired a thorough grasp of the Greek language and scholastic tradition. It is uncertain whether he traveled to Athens or Alexandria, the sites of the two remaining (Platonic) philosophical schools, but certainly he was acquainted with their works. His life combined stately privileges and duties, and a learned leisure in which he pursued a vast project of translating and commenting on philosophical texts. This undertaking was cut short by his execution, circa 525 AD. It is important to realize that the Aristotelian works which were available to European scholars in the early Middle Ages, included only the six books on logic that had been translated by Boethius. These became the standard text of non-Biblical learning in the thousand years between the fall of Rome and the beginnings of the modern era, and were known collectively as Organon (the “instrument” of knowledge and well-ordered thought). Organon comprises treatises on the internal logic of language and linguistically formed propositions. Aristotle’s more general treatises on biological form, function and development (De Anima), were lost to the West for the first 800 years AD.

Aurelius Augustinus Hipponensis (St. Augustine), circa 400 AD, is presented as the first Western thinker to have discussed the similarities and differences between “natural signs” (signa naturalia) and “given signs” (signa data). The former lead to the knowledge of something other than themselves – one might think of the relations of physical contiguity, such as the relation of smoke to fire, or the relation of a fossil to the phenotype that left it. The latter (signa data) are mutually exchanged by living systems, in order to show, as well as they can, the feelings of their minds, of their thoughts, or more simply of their perceptions.

This Middle Age misinterpretation of Aristotle, by accidental exclusion of De Anima, has resulted in ordo orandi (“order of speaking” – hierarchy of knowledge), through which things of “the external world (res) are signified by mental concepts (intellectus), which are then signified by spoken words (voce) and these, in turn, are signified by written characters (scripta). Supporting this system is the principle that: at the [root] of written and spoken discourse there is a mental speech (oratio mentis) in which thinking is performed”.
hierarchy of knowledge
The hierarchy of knowledge (ordo orandi)

“Spoken words are the symbols of mental experience and written words are the symbols of spoken words. Just as all men have not the same writing, so all men have not the same speech sounds, but the mental experiences, which these directly symbolize, are the same for all, as also are those things of which our experiences are the images…”
De Interpretatione is a part of the Aristotelian Organon, it deals specifically with semantics, hermeneutics and propositional logic; it focuses on signa data via the relations of words and sentences.

Unsurprisingly, ordo orandi has resulted in a top-down hierarchy of knowledge, in which sign relations follow linguistic relations. Of course we now know this to be an evolutionarily impossibility, as language (even oratio mentis) could not have preceded simpler forms of symbolic exchange and interpretation (sign relations). Even so, the habit of attempting to logically derive deep knowledge persists to this day. Herein, I believe, may be embedded the two central problems of modernity:
1) Homo sapiens assume ourselves to be smarter and more important than we are.
– God made the Earth, the plants, and the animals for us, and we are to keep and rule over them.
2) Top-down logic is one-sided and short-sighted.
– nature in composed of bottom-up, top-down, (multi-)lateral, and interconnected (complex) logical structures.
Molecular interaction map of the toll-like receptor (TLR) signaling network(3)
– in reality this set of molecular interactions has no “top”.

One can not help but wonder what the world would be like if medieval (European) scholars, such as Augustine of Hippo, had understood the whole of Aristotle, including that “sign relations are a subset of genuinely causal existential phenomena of relational organization”. Chances are that the modern sciences of physics, chemistry, and biology would not have called solely upon the top-down ordo orandi to explain how a biochemical set of relations (i.e. living systems) could come to know about – much less think about – the set of physical relations existing independently of, and external to, themselves. Perhaps a more realistic method of knowledge generation, and thus a truer knowledge set, may be derived from bottom-up hierarchies, lateral hierarchies, and interconnected parallel hierarchies, as well as top-down hierarchies? It really is mind-bogglingly difficult to step out of what we know, or better, what we think we know, even if we see clearly, as we now do, that our knowledge leads to breakage and discontinuity.

There is, I believe, an important albeit intuitive observation to be made here. It may not be possible for one to understand, come to terms with, and implement this more natural complex of hierarchies, that understanding may necessarily require more than one – person, ant, bacterium… perhaps even more than one species.

If re-oriented, the discoverable relations between system x and entity, state or event y – as those relations become actualized during the course of the interaction whereby y is acted upon as a sign of z for x – can become the focus of empirical and falsifiable scientific investigation. This may sound unworkably complicated, but it is the kind of “enmattered formulable essence” which Aristotle called for in relation biologically [self-] organized systems.

“A physicist would define an affection of soul differently from a dialectician . . . the former assigns the material conditions, the latter the form or formulable essence . . . Thus, [for the dialectician], the essence of a house is assigned in such a formula as ‘a shelter against destruction by wind, rain, and heat’; while the physicist would describe it as ‘stones, bricks, and timbers.’ But there is a third possible description which would say that it was that form in that material with that purpose or end. Which, then, among these is entitled to be regarded as the genuine physicist? The one who confines himself to the material, or the one who restricts himself to the formulable essence alone? Is it not rather the one who combines both in a single formula?” – Aristotle, De Anima

In discussions about a previous post in this series (Governance), a number of my peers have commented that it seems unfair and/or meaningless to compare hierarchical human cultures with anarchic ant mounds or bacterial colonies, because humans are much more complex, more evolved(note v), and because we are self-aware. Biosemiotics fortifies my argument for meaningful analogies between humans and ants in regard to self-organization and self-regulation (i.e. self-governance). Indeed, it would seem to say that because ants and bacteria are closer to the root of the biological system, they may be truer to (less abstracted from) reality.

i) There are references to “science of science policy (SoSP)”, but this is the realm of business and politics – not science. Neither politics nor business are sciences, and the term “political science” is a misnomer.

ii) The assertion “continual adaptive growth” implies continued growth. I find it difficult to accept the relation of those terms and see continued adaptation as real. Continued growth seems to belong exclusively to the realms of cosmology and economy – neither of which are real, but theoretic.

iii) Conceive – from Latin concipere (“to take”), from con- (“together”) + capio (“to take”).

iv) Technically, in modern biology, phenotype is the composite of an organism’s observable characteristics or traits, such as its morphology, development, biochemical or physiological properties, phenology, behavior, and products of behavior (such as a bird’s nest). Phenotypes result from the expression of an organism’s genes as well as the influence of environmental factors and the interactions between the two. – Wikipedia

v) It is physically impossible for humans to be “more evolved” than ants or bacteria. Quite simply, living systems did not stop evolving with the emergence of Homo sapiens.

1a) D. Favareau, “THE EVOLUTIONARY HISTORY OF BIOSEMIOTICS”, chapter one of “Essential Readings in Biosemiotics”, (2010), p.2, Springer,

1b) D. Favareau, “Essential Readings in Biosemiotics”, (2010), preface (not available without login to publisher), Springer,


3) K.Oda and H.Kitano, “A comprehensive map of the toll-like receptor signaling network”, (2006), Nature,